The two-month West Coast dock dispute was settled in late November, but not until after President Bush obtained an injunction to halt the shutdown that was underway at all 29 ports from Seattle to San Diego. The injunction imposed the full 80-day “cooling off” period permitted by Sections 206 through 210 of the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act. The settlement, however, came about a month before the injunction would have expired.
This labor dispute pitted the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) against the Pacific Maritime Association (PMA). The ILWU represents all 10,500 nonmanagement workers in all 29 ports. Apart from management, there is no such thing as a non-union worker on the docks. Any attempt to hire any union-free workers, even though the law clearly permits the hiring of non-union replacement workers during labor disputes, would be met with threats of violence, if not actual violence by the ILWU. As Jim Spinosa, president of the ILWU, said, “We will fight like hell to keep our jobs.” What that means can be inferred from the history of the ILWU starting with “Bloody Thursday” on July 5, 1934, during the infamous dock strike (about which more below).
The PMA is the organization that represents all the employers involved with the docks in labor relations with the ILWU. The PMA was formed by the employers to present a united front against the ILWU in contract negotiations and labor disputes. Since unions are exempt from antitrust laws, the law permits one union to monopolize all the labor in an industry, and it also permits the employers in those industries to act together in dealing with such monopoly unions. Industry-wide collective bargaining before this dispute resulted in average blue-collar workers on the docks making base wages of over $82,000 per year, not counting overtime. The unionized clerks, whose job is to keep track of cargo going in and out of the ports, made over $118,000 per year.
The issue between the PMA and the ILWU in this dispute was not wages and salaries. It was the introduction of labor-saving technologies on the docks, which would allow west-coast ports to begin to catch up with productivity gains and cost reductions that are routine elsewhere. For example, on ILWU docks the use of a single crane usually requires two crane operators, a clerk, and a signalman. In Singapore all those tasks are done by one worker operating a computerized cab.
The PMA didn’t seek to go as far as computerized cabs. They merely wanted the union to agree to allow clerks to use barcode scanners and hand-held computers, and allow truck drivers and their cargoes to check in to terminals using fast passes similar to those used on toll bridges and roads. It was estimated that these innovations would eliminate about 600 of the 1,200 clerks’ jobs at the 29 ports. The PMA agreed to find alternative dock jobs for the displaced clerks at no cut in pay, and to downsize through attrition, not immediate dismissals. Indeed, the actual number of jobs on the docks would almost certainly increase as modernization increased the volume of cargo passing through the ports.
The ILWU would have none of it. It insisted that all the new jobs in the future that might be created by changing technology be designated as union jobs. For example, it may be possible for cranes and other dock machinery to become operated by computerized remote control by people not actually on the docks. Such jobs could be contracted out to union-free firms and individuals. The union insisted on maintaining its monopoly ownership of all dock work now and into the future. In the settlement the ILWU got its way, but acceded to the introduction of some labor-saving technology.
One cannot fault the ILWU for looking out for its own interests and purporting to look out for the interests of its members. It, like all unions, is a private organization trying to do the best it can for itself. So, too, is the PMA. Under a proper rule of law, the government would have no business interfering with the bargaining process between the two, nor would it be just for the government to prevent the ILWU from striking or the PMA from locking out ILWU workers. The two sides would be able to decide for themselves whether they needed any “cooling off” period. The government’s sole responsibility would be to keep the peace, preventing each side from using force to pursue its interests.
Rule of Law Failed
But the rule of law lapsed in 1934 at the birth of the ILWU on Bloody Thursday, when the government failed to keep the peace. As a result many people were injured and several were killed as Harry Bridges and his henchmen used violence to prevent any union-free workers from working. No prosecutions of the perpetrators were ever undertaken. Unions are now immune to federal anti-extortion laws. This is the legacy the ILWU would “fight like hell” to preserve.
Through exclusive representation, which requires antitrust immunity to be effective, the Taft-Hartley Act protects union monopolies from competition from other unions and from union-free workers and firms. With Taft-Hartley, Congress created the possibility of union monopolies’ provoking national emergencies by shutting down entire industries. Congress then tried to solve the problem it created by adding Sections 206–210 to the Act, which President Bush used to open up the docks.
If unions were treated like all other private organizations in ordinary law of contract and torts, and in criminal law, some jobs on some ports would be unionized and some would not be. No union could shut down the entire west coast. There would be open competition between unions and between unions and union-free workers. The fault, in this dispute was not with private interests’ pursuing their goals. The fault was with labor legislation that removed unions from the rule of law.
