World in the Grip of an Idea: 8. Russia – Impotent Populace and Massive State

In this series, Dr. Carson examines the connection between ideology and the revolutions of our time and traces the impact on several major countries and the spread of the ideas and practices around the world.

The ordinary methods and language of scholarship are inadequate for and inappropriate to the examina­tion and assessment of Soviet Com­munism. Some examples may illus­trate the point. According to most accounts, the Soviet Union is now one of the leading industrial nations in the world. In fact, the Soviet Union has long been the leading ex­porter of communist ideology in the world. The few products it can sell on the world market are offered in support of the ideology. On the other hand, it must surely be the leading importer of scientific and technological information. It has had the most diligent crew of researchers and translators of scientific, medical, and technologi­cal journals from other lands of any country in the world. What is the balance of trade? Not even those trained in the new mathematics could compute the balance from the export of ideology and the import of scientific information.

A country which can only dispose of its shoddy merchandise by erect­ing barriers to keep other goods out and prevent its inhabitants from going elsewhere to shop should not be styled a leading industrial na­tion. (One of the considerable joys of those who can take a trip to Western Europe or America is the opportunity to go shopping. Those fortunate enough to be able to go abroad are usually besieged by friends to make purchases for them while they are there.) It should be called a leading jailer nation.

A nation which exports is com­munist ideology and imports scien­tific information no more has a balance of trade than does a sprig of mistletoe attached to the limb of a tree. It is a parasite. The language of political science is only a hin­drance in describing elections in which there is only one candidate, or constitutions whose guarantees of freedom of religion only serve the power of government in launching a massive campaign against religion. Such terms as “fraud,” “decep­tion,” and “cruel joke” serve all too well. Legal scholars are superfluous to the study of trials in which the penalty has already been deter­mined. The paraphernalia of schol­arship, when applied to the Soviet Union, tends to conceal what is going on rather than expose it.

Maladjusted Individuals

Zhores Medvedev, a Russian biologist, was seized by Soviet police in 1970 and locked up in a mental institution. The diagnosis described him as being unable to adjust to the social environment, as suffering from reformist delusions, and as having an exaggerated sense of his own importance. Medvedev suggests, in a book about his ex­perience, that by the criteria ap­plied to him certain important personages must have been in much worse condition than he was. While he prudently avoids naming them, since he was still in Russia, it is clear that he was talking about Stalin and Khrushchev. He says:

Take, for example, that outstand­ing figure [Stalin] whom we all remember so well as an economist, a military leader, philosopher, statesman and diplomat. And suddenly out of the blue he publishes his article on the prob­lems of linguistics and personally begins to introduce tangerine and eucalyptus trees to the Crimea. Then there was that other great leader [Khrushchev], also wise politician, diplomat, economist, agricultural specialist and historian of the Party. Suddenly he begins to make decisions about the architecture of apartment houses, arbitrates in a disagreement between two schools of genetics . . . , forbids the private owner­ship of cattle in the countryside and teaches writers the secrets of their craft. And of each of them it was true to say that they were proud, expressed themselves dogmatically and were convinced of the supreme value and in­fallibility of their views. Of course eucalyptus trees never got accustomed to the Crimea and maize doesn’t grow in the North, but the behavior of both of these men continued to be determined by the nature of their delusions without adapting to reality.

The behavior of one of them [Stalin] was further aggravated by persecution mania and sadism—which led him to spend a lot of time “discovering” im­aginary conspiracies, introducing dra­conian laws, organizing mass arrests, executions and tortures, and he was con­pletely isolated in a world of his own.¹

It was not, I take it, Medvedev’s point that either Stalin or Khrushchev was insane, though he presents some strong evidence to that effect against Stalin. Rather, he wished to demonstrate that any delusions he might have were puny and dwarfed by the mammoth ones of these two leaders. (He might have added the delusions of Lenin and Brezhnev to the others, but he had risked enough already. Even though Stalin and Khrushchev are dead and in some ways discredited, it is not possible to know in what ways they may be safely attacked. But Lenin is a sort of god, and Brezhnev is alive and in command.) But by calling attention to their delusions he does provide an angle from which to begin the assessment of Soviet Communism.

Marxist Delusions

The delusions of Soviet leaders arise from communist ideology. Marxism is a fantasy. Karl Marx had the delusion that he had discovered the secret of history. His notion about the inevitable triumph of the proletariat is no more scien­tific than is the belief that the posi­tion of the planets controls our destiny. Yet his ideology provided the foundation for Lenin’s delusion that the moment for the revolution had arrived in Russia, and from thence it should spread to the rest of the world. The delusion gave men the effrontery to attempt to impose the ideology on everyone within their power.

There is a crucial distinction be­tween the delusions associated with insanity and those born of ideology. The insane person suffers from or is afflicted with his delusions. By con­trast, it is those on whom ideologi­cal delusions are imposed that suf­fer. Marx did not suffer from his delusions, nor did Lenin, nor did Stalin, nor did Khrushchev, but a goodly portion of the peoples of the world have. Another distinction between ideological delusions and those of insanity is that the insane cannot function effectively in their environment. Ideologues, again, can function effectively, but they inhibit those on whom the ideology is imposed from acting very effec­tively.

The perverse effects of these delu­sions are to be accounted for by the assumptions and presumptions of the ideology. Karl Marx had what may best be described as a criminal mind. Not the mind of a petty thief, of course. Not even the mind of those who are ordinarily thought of as directing organized crime. He had a cosmic criminal mind.

Theft, through Revolution

The crime which Marx contem­plated was theft, the theft of all pro­perty used in the production and distribution of goods. The method by which the property was to be taken he called Revolution. The cohorts who would assist in this enterprise—the proletariat—would be rewarded by receiving the fruits of production. Thus far, his scheme paralleled just about any plan for carrying out a robbery. But Marx added two dimensions to theft or crime which they do not ordinarily have. First, he declared that this act of universal robbery—the World Revolution—was inevitable. Sec­ond, he conceived an ideology which was supposed to justify this vast thievery. He wove the whole into the framework of an anti-religious religion.

The universal plunder which Marx prescribed was, of course, to be only a prelude, a necessary prelude to universal justice, peace, harmony, well-being, and freedom. Man was to be eman­cipated from all the constraints that had kept his true nature from emerging. He was to be trans­formed, following upon the transformation of the economy, and a new society would emerge. The eventual end would justify the plunderous means, though Marx held that the expropriation—plunder, thievery, robbery, or whatever it should be called—was also justified. Marx laid down no specifics for the emergence of this new society and new man. Presuma­bly they would emerge naturally once the expropriation had been completed and the means of produc­tion were in the hands of the “workers.”

If theft can be justified, then all other crimes are justified thereby: torture, slavery, extortion, compul­sion, murder, fraud, threats, assault, and every species of restraint. If stealing is justified, nay, required, by the laws of history, then all resistance to theft must be met with whatever force is necessary to overcome it. The force to overcome the resistance to the robbery must be as great as, no, greater than, all the energy which men will put forth to cling to their possessions.

Emphasis on Ownership

It is not simply that man has an affinity for property, though he has; it is even more the case that proper­ty has an affinity for man, so to speak. To put it more directly, pro­perty must be owned before it realizes its potential as property. Property without ownership is an abstraction, an abstraction waiting for an owner to appear to give it character and fulfillment. To divest man of this relationship and pre­vent him from forming it runs coun­ter to a metaphysical chemistry be­tween man and property. If it were justified, then so would every as­sault upon man which would achieve it.

Universalized theft, or national­ized theft, as it has been experi­enced thus far, requires universal­ized force. This accounts for the massive state that emerged with Soviet Communism. There is, however, yet another reason for this swollen condition. It, too, has its roots in the nature of property. Pro­perty requires attention if it is to be productive. Divesting individuals of private property does not remove this requirement; instead, it ag­gravates it. By and large, the pro­perty that had been owned by in­dividuals was taken over by the government in the Soviet Union. The management, or attempted management, of this property re­quired a large number of bureau­crats. The combination of universal­ized force and bureaucratic management of property produced the massive state.

The Importance of Believing

The delusions that accompany communist ideology are manifold. They are delusions such as are necessary to believe it and try to put it into practice. They are the delusions of the criminal mind writ large. Theft is a crime. So are all the acts done in support of theft. Marx conceived the most monstrous crime imaginable. Lenin and his followers carried out this crime within the Russian Empire and fostered its spread to the rest of the world. But it was necessary that they not think of it as a crime and desirable that people in general not think of it that way. To that end, the law which makes theft a crime must be held to be invalid; the moral code which supports the idea must be denied; the cultural in­heritance which bolsters property and private rights must be negated; and the age old conceptions of hu­man nature must be put at naught. All that is left in support of com­munism is human will, the will to believe, and the force that resides in its monopoly by government. The more closely the prescriptions of communist ideology are fulfilled, the more nearly impotent the populace. The more massive the state the more helpless the populace.

Therein lies the dilemma of com­munism and, indeed, of all social­ism. Communism could only suc­ceed by engaging the efforts, the wills, the energies, and the initiative of the population behind it. But these are held in thrall by the massive state, by the ubiquitous police, by the swollen bureaucracy, and by the requirement of ideologi­cal conformity. The populace could only become effective by the reduc­tion of the state and the restoration of freedom. Every step in that direc­tion is a retreat from communism. The dilemma cannot be resolved; it is inherent in communism. The dilemma arose from the delusions of communism.

Reforming Human Nature

One of the primary delusions of communism is that human nature can be transformed so as to remove the pursuit of self-interest from human behavior. It should not be necessary to turn to experience and history to learn this. The contemplation of man and the condi­tion in which he finds himself should be sufficient for discovering the essentiality of his pursuit of self-interest.

Human consciousness is such that only the individual concerned is aware of his needs and wants and what priorities they have. Life on this earth is of a character that re­quires that in many instances he must look after himself. He must look before he crosses the street lest he be run over. He must take care what he puts in his mouth lest he in­gest some harmful substance. Even roses have thorns, and he who would pick them must be careful that he not be stuck by them.

The amounts of goods and services available are limited, but our desires for them are not. Hence, we contend or compete for them, and each does well to protect his own in­terest in the trades that take place. Indeed, it is difficult to grasp how any trade, sale, or purchase could be made if the individuals were not ac­ting in their interest. A disinter­ested purchase would be one made without regard to what was wanted, the quantity and quality of the goods, or what priorities might exist about acquiring them.

Root Out Self-Interest

A second delusion of communism is that removing the cultural sup­ports to the individual would result in rooting out self-interest. On the contrary, the same culture which supports the individual acts to direct, limit, restrain, and civilize his pursuit of self-interest. Civilized people recognize and observe limits on their pursuit of self-interest. Good manners require that the in­dividual take his place in line, that he defer to others in many cases, and that he respect the equal rights of others. A civilized culture even as it protects the individual in his pur­suits inculcates the belief that there are occasions when the individual should deny himself in order to aid and care for others.

The family as a unit is especially dependent upon parental restraint in asserting their interests in order to provide for the children and those unable to take care of themselves. It is the duty of the parents as well to inhibit their children when they rambunctiously pursue their interests, in the in­terest of family harmony and peace in the community. Community, too, depends upon apparently selfless acts by its members in defense against aggressors and to rescue those who are endangered.

But none of this need be in dero­gation of the individual’s pursuit of his own self-interest. One of the great missions of culture and civil­ization is to provide a peaceful and harmonious framework within which the individual can seek his own constructively. To destroy the culture because it supports the in­dividual will not alter the in­dividual’s determination to pursue his self-interest; it will only remove the restraints upon it. The reason for this should be clear. Our pursuit of self-interest is not culturally in­duced; it arises from our nature and the nature of conditions within which we find ourselves. Commun­ism delusively pits itself against culture when its true enemy is human nature.

Reliance on Force

A third delusion is that force, or government, can be used effectively to transform human nature and pro­duce a peaceful and productive society. So far as we know, human nature cannot be changed, but human behavior can be, at least to some extent. But force is only a minor adjunct in successful efforts to change human behavior. It can be used to punish and inhibit wrongdoing, but it is the weakest of all means for producing rightdoing. Rightdoing proceeds from and engages the best efforts of the wills of individuals. Force can no doubt produce a modicum of obedience, but it will usually be minimal and will tend to be limited even further by its failure to engage the con­structive ingenuity of the ones com­plying.

From these basic delusions follow the mass of delusions by which the Soviet Union has been misruled for over sixty years now.

It should not be necessary, as I say, to resort to historical evidence to validate the above observations. But if it is, the record of the Soviet Union provides a cornucopia of sup­porting evidence.

Breakdowns in Production

An early visitor to the Soviet Union proclaimed, in a burst of en­thusiasm: “I have seen the future, and it works.” Those who have ex­amined the situation over a longer period of time and more thoroughly would be more likely to say: “I have seen the future of Communism, and not even the plumbing works.”

That is, however, but a poor joke and a half-truth. Surely, there are water closets in the Soviet Union that work, at least some of the time.

More important, if we should follow this lead it would take us away from, not toward, the greatest failures of Soviet Communism. It would take us into the realm of that pseudo-science, macro-economics, where the greatest truth we would be able to discover is that statistics can be used to deceive. There is no comparison between goods pro­duced by decree and those produced to supply wants registered in the market. Goods produced by decree are qualitatively inferior; they are orphans in the market place, seek­ing some kindhearted soul who will adopt them. Macro-economics can only deal with them by declaring them the equal of all other similar goods, for only thus can they be reduced to statistics. Since they are not, the result can only be a decep­tion.

Colossal Failures

Even so, it needs to be affirmed that Soviet Communism has had signal economic failures. The Soviet Union inherited one of the most pro­ductive grain-producing areas in the world and succeeded so well by collectivizing and introducing state farms that even by opening millions of acres of new land it became a grain-deficit land. Central planning of industrial activity is a recognized failure today, even by many Soviet economists. In fact, a multi­volumned encyclopedia on how not to produce goods could be compiled from the Soviet experience. A “suc­cessful” plant manager is one who can get a low quota of production, have a very large stockpile of parts he will need, and manage to produce a sufficient quantity of shoddy goods to exceed his quota.

One of the reasons for the failure of centralized planning coupled with an atmosphere of fear comes out in the story below. It was told by a man who had been a Soviet inspector.

As inspector I once arrived at a plant which was supposed to have delivered mining machines, but did not do it. When I entered the plant premises, I saw that the machines were piled up all over the place, but they were all un­finished. I asked what was going on. The director gave evasive answers. Finally, when the big crowd surrounding us had disappeared, he called me to his office.

There, the story came out. It seems that the specifications called for the machines to be painted with red oil-resistant varnish. But the only red varnish that he had was not oil-resistant. He had green oil-resistant varnish, but was afraid that if he used this in violation of instructions he would get eight years in prison. The inspector knew the machines were badly needed, was certain that whether they were painted red or green could make little difference, but he too feared a prison sentence should he authorize the change. He did cable the ministry hoping for a quick decision in favor of using the green varnish.

But it took unusually long. Apparent­ly they did not want to take any chances at the ministry either, and they wanted to cover themselves. Finally I received permission. I put this cablegram from the ministry in my pocket and kept it for the rest of my life, and signed the note allowing the use of the green paint. . . .²

The infelicities of Soviet produc­tion may be best summed up by this Russian joke related by John Gun­ther:

One Russian tells another that the Soviet authorities have perfected an in­tricate atomic bomb that will fit into a suitcase, and that this will one day be delivered to a target like New York. The second Russian replies, “Impossible. Where would anybody get a suitcase?”³

Serving the Rulers

But the greatest failures of Soviet Communism have not been econom­ic. Indeed, such successes as it has had, aside from the exportation of ideology, have been quantitative and economic. Large universities have been conceived and built, a modicum of education made univer­sally available to the young, numerous physicians trained, whole new cities brought into being, hydroelectric dams built, and so on.

Political power has been brought to bear so as to produce what was most wanted by those who ruled. The priorities of the political authorities have sooner or later been met, though it would be an er­ror to conceive of this having been done economically. It has been done at horrendously excessive cost in lives, suffering, deprivation, and wasted natural resources. Indeed, in the absence of a free market, the Soviet rulers have no way of deter­mining what it should cost to pro­duce goods. Still, they have pro­duced huge quantities of generally inferior goods.

Social and Spiritual

The greatest failures of Soviet Communism are social and spiri­tual. Many of these failures should be the occasion for rejoicing around the world. None can rejoice, of course, about the persecution, the terror, the suffering, and the hard­ships of the peoples of the Russian Empire. They have endured for many years now an occupation, as it were, by an alien force. That alien force has been animated by Com­munist ideology and includes all who have attempted to impose their will on the Russian people in its name.

That alien force launched the most massive assault upon the human spirit, upon individuality, upon religion, upon society, and upon the family that the world has ever known. This assault has been carried out by the assembled power of a totalitarian state, carried out by all the devices conceivable to a criminal mind: brutal murder, tor­ture, propaganda, threats, exile, mass starvation, and incomparable terror. A gigantic effort has been made to wipe out the heritage of a people, to destroy the ancient bonds of community, and to break peoples under the wheel of the state. All who have any fellow feeling for others should view this action with sorrow and compassion for the peoples who thus suffer.

The Human Spirit Survives

Nonetheless, there is occasion for rejoicing. Word comes to us from the Russian people that the human spirit has not been crushed. It is wondrously alive in the vibrant eyes and stern personality of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and, no doubt, in millions of others.

This is not to say that the unleashing of such might for such purposes against a people has not produced gaping wounds and ugly scars, so to speak. Surely it has. Many of the bonds of community have indeed been broken. The fami­ly has been sorely tried by inform­ing, by the ease of divorce, by the necessity for women to do heavy work. Institutional religion has been made largely subservient to the state, where it has been permit­ted to survive. Society has lost con­trol over all institutions by which it may function. Propaganda has taken a heavy toll upon mental development and understanding. Fear has driven frank conversation into nooks and crannies.

But human nature has survived and endured. The Soviet regime has not made a dent in the determina­tion of the Russian people to pursue their self-interest. Farmers pursue their self-interest vigorously by avidly cultivating the little plots of land from which the government allows them to keep the produce. People are ever on the alert to hear of some scarce item available in the stores, and scurry out to purchase it when the word reaches them. The pursuit of self-interest by Party members is almost palpable, but they are distinguished from the general populace only in the corrupt methods available to them.

The Russian people have no inten­tion of committing suicide, which is what the abandonment of self-inter­est entails. They may be hampered by the rules and regulations in their pursuit of it, but they seek it as cer­tainly as an alcoholic sought booze in America during Prohibition. Those who value life, then, may re­joice that Russians are still pursu­ing their self-interest.

Society Suffers

The wound is nowhere deeper and the scars nowhere uglier than upon what for a better word we call socie­ty in the Soviet Union. In the vul­gar language of today, all activity, life and relationships are divided in­to a public and a private sector. Where people are moderately free, there are actually several realms: the realm of government, the realm of society, and the realm of the in­dividual that is personal and pri­vate. These are not exclusive spheres; they are rather comple­mentary, interdependent, and inter­acting realms.

Society encompasses that realm of social relationships that are largely voluntary, the realm of man­ners, customs, traditions, morality, voluntary institutions, and ways by which individuals live fruitfully and peacefully with one another. The cultural heritage is activated and carried on largely by society. It is the arena of influence and persuasion rather than of force.

It may be correct to refer to a “public” and “private” sector in the Soviet Union, though the public sector has been elephantized and the private sector dwarfed. But society has been virtually de­stroyed. Society depends upon widespread trust, confidence, and general good will, as well as a con­siderable measure of freedom. These have been all but wiped out in the Soviet Union. Trust and good will can hardly survive the inform­ing of children on parents, of neighbor upon neighbor, of husband upon wife: all of which has been fostered and encouraged, even re­quired, by the Soviet system. They can hardly survive, either, the con­stant surveillance, the hidden microphones, the keeping of exten­sive dossiers by the police, the listening in on telephone conversa­tions, and the opening of mail: all common practice.

Society needs institutions which it largely controls: churches, clubs, libraries, markets, hospitals, and various sorts of voluntary associa­tions. Where any of these have been permitted in the Soviet Union, they are under the thumb of the Party which, in turn, is an instrument of the state. The lines of communica­tion on which society depends are clogged by a massive state.

Two developments have taken place in the absence of society. One is a crudeness of relationships in general. Clerks are usually rude and harsh of manner. Hedrick Smith notes that there is a Russian man­ner that comes across in “public as coarse indifference, passive fatal­ism, and pushy discourtesy. Western visitors have commented on the glum, shuttered faces of Rus­sian street crowds, and the brusque, negative surliness of service people. In our early months, I remember nodding at Russians, or saying hello if their eyes met mine at close range in public but all I ever got in return was an impassive stare.“⁴

This coarseness of social relations evinces itself in yet another way, in busybodiness, which has no doubt been promoted by Communism. Leona Schechter, who spent several years in Moscow, gives several ex­amples of it. Here is one. She had taken one of her children to school but had neglected to dress very warmly against the cold:

. Just as we were about to go in the school door, a red-haired Russian lady . stopped to harangue me about the way I was dressed. I told her I didn’t want to get Barney into the building late so she let me go, but she was waiting when I came out. She yelled at me that I was stupid to come out without boots. She warned that I would get very sick if I didn’t dress properly. I stood listening to her lecture, freezing, wanting nothing so much as to run home and warm my feet. She believed she was doing her socialist duty.5

Socialist duty it might be, but sociable it was not.

Rebuilding Society through Private Circles

The other development is the rudimentary rebuilding of society in tightly knit private circles. Friends gather in the kitchens—about the only possible meeting place—of private homes, reasonably safe from informers, from hidden microphones, and from the ubi­quitous police. There, spontaneous and free communication can take place. The Russians are then quite different, according to Smith: “But in private, within a trusted circle, usually the family and close friends but often embracing new acquaintances very quickly if some per­sonal chord of empathy is touched, they are among the warmest, most cheerful, generous, emotional and overwhelmingly hospitable people on earth. “6

There is some evidence that fol­lowing the relaxation of the rigidity of Soviet regime in the 1960′s these circles have expanded. Manuscripts of works that the regime will not permit to be published circulate in what is called samzidat editions (privately copied). Groups of people gather to view paintings that can­not get a showing in governmental­ly controlled museums. Concerts are even performed in what must be thought of as private. The account that Zhores and Roy Medvedev give of friends and colleagues who came to the aid of Zhores when he was locked up in a mental institution indicates that for some, at least, a considerable society is form­ing. The Communists have not suc­ceeded, then, in destroying the old society and building a new one. Society has just gone underground, awaiting the opportunity, the freedom, to emerge once again in full flower.

Perhaps the most dramatic fail­ure of the Soviet Communists, how­ever, has been their inability to wipe out religion. Decades of atheistic propaganda, the widespread closing of churches, the denial of general ac­cess to means for study, worship, and religious training have failed to accomplish the sought-after result. Of course, the assault on religion has done great damage. Leona Schechter gives this foreboding ac­count from one who had experienc­ed it:

But Pyotr with his sad, sensitive blue eyes and Christlike beard decried even the Revolution. For the first time we heard him speak from the depths of his spirit. He appealed for the return of the Christian values of the Russian Or­thodox Church. “We were better off when we could appeal to human values, the values of the church. Our lives were richer and we had the excitement and mystery of holy days. We had a sense of man. Now all we have are empty slogans and corruption. The Revolution destroyed Christianity in Russia and it also destroyed the Russian spirit.”⁷

It did not, of course, destroy Chris­tianity or the Russian spirit. It did largely destroy the social and com­munal aspect of Christianity in Russia, driving it underground, and depriving public life of its redeem­ing values.

But religion is alive in Russia. An American correspondent was asked by a Russian acquaintance if he believed in God. He indicated that he did not. “Just wait,” the Russian replied, “You have not lived in Russia long enough yet.” That is hyperbole, to be sure, for not all Russians believe in God, but the point is well taken nonetheless. There is by most accounts the in­dication of a religious resurgence in Russia. The authorities long held that religion was dying out, that it was just a relic, and that only old women went to church. But an in­teresting phenomenon can now be reported: as one generation of old women dies out, another takes their place.

Covert Christianity

Those who attend church are mainly the ones who have no hope of gaining position or advantage from the Soviet powers, but even those who do have such hopes can practice their religion privately, and some do. Millions openly profess Christianity; an untold number of others await the day when they may do so.

The Schechters visited a museum in a remote province of the Soviet Union. It was next to the site of an ancient Christian church, destroyed by the Arabs in the tenth century. “Until recently no one knew what the original church looked like, but a traveler found a bas relief of it in Paris. Since then new buildings in the center of Yerevan have followed the lines of the church’s architec­ture. Bits of colored mosaic and broken stone pieces left after the Arabs . . . are sorted and waiting for the time when the church can be rebuilt.”⁸

That is surely a parable of reli­gion in Russia; it exists in carefully preserved bits and pieces awaiting the time when the church can be rebuilt.

A Communist Paradox

Soviet Communism has failed; it has failed to provide people with goods and services economically and competitively; it has failed to root out self-interest; it has failed significantly to alter human nature; it has failed to build a new society; it has failed to crush religion. It has succeeded in erecting a massive state which has imposed an oppres­sive system on the Russian peoples. Undergirding this system is Com­munist ideology.

Herein lies a paradox. The Soviet system is underpinned by an ideology which none living under it may believe. True, the propaganda machine grinds out the same old phrases. Party members attend the interminable sessions on the ideology and the Party line. Those called upon to do so will mouth the correct words and sentences. But there is much speculation that no one believes what he is saying. Hedrick Smith reports this conver­sation:

“You have to go to these political meetings but nobody listens,” said a plump Leningrad schoolteacher in her late thirties…. “When the director of our school gives the lecture, he tries to make it interesting. He’s a nice man—a Party member but a nice man. But everyone is bored and nobody believes it.”

“What about the person giving the lecture?” Ann asked her.

“Even he doesn’t believe what he’s saying. The older generation really believed in Lenin and they felt this was the way to build a new society. But my generation doesn’t believe it at all. We know it’s false.”⁹

Some even doubt that the members of the politburo any longer believe in the ideology.¹º

What Sustains the Power?

Supposing this to be substantial­ly true, what keeps Soviet Com­munism in power, then? Many things, no doubt, some obvious, some not so obvious. Soviet Communism has inertia going for it. Its leaders hold the power over a mas­sive state that is well established. The populace is impotent, lacking either the means to contend with it or effective communication with those who may oppose it. Though the terror has abated in recent years, the Soviet state is still a fearful thing, and many still remember the harsh and prolonged terror of the Stalin years.

The Soviet Union has recognition from the ruling powers of the world. Two things more, at the least, sus­tain it. One is the idea that has the world in its grip. The Soviet Union represents the premier effort to con­cert all efforts behind the achievement of felicity on this earth. Those who are advancing what they be­lieve to be a triumphant idea can­not, by and large, ever have it known or accepted that the idea has failed in Russia. The fall of Com­munism in Russia would have a devastating impact on the idea; it must not be permitted to happen.

The other thing that keeps Soviet Communism going is fear of the alternative. Communism has ever depended upon a hatred of those whom it denominates as its enemies. All its propaganda does not succeed in making Communism loved, but it has much greater suc­cess in making enemies hated. “Capitalism” is, of course, the putative enemy of Communism, but it invented an enemy which was the personification of all evil. The generic name of that enemy is “fascism.” Fascism did, perhaps does, exist, of course, but not fascism as the Communist Party line would have it conceived, not the fascism which was the diametric op­posite of communism. On the con­trary, fascism was a species of socialism, revolutionary socialism even, bearing the closest resem­blance of all to Marxism-Leninism.

For the examination of this sup­posed enemy of communism, we turn now for a look at Nazi Ger­many.

Next: 9. Germany: Ideology Con­tends for Power.

 

—FOOTNOTES—

^lZhores A. Medvedev and Roy A. Medvedev, A Question of Madness (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), pp. 183-84.

²David Granick, “Plant Managers and Their Overseers,- in Joseph L. Nogee, Man, State, and Society in the Soviet Union (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 198.

^³John Gunther, Inside Russia Today (New York: Harper & Row, 1962, rev. ed.), p. 76.

⁴Hedrick Smith, The Russians (New York: Quadrangle, 1976), p. 104.

⁵Leona and Jerrold Schechter, et al., An American Family in Moscow (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1975), p. 104.

⁶Smith, op. cit., p. 104.

⁷Schechter and Schechter, op. cit., pp. 235-36.

⁸Ibid., p. 372.

⁹Smith, op. cit., p. 288.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 292.