Washington Should Adjust Its Foreign Policy to More Accurately Reflect American Security Interests
President Bush’s proposed $48 billion military spending increase for next year exceeds what any other nation devotes to the military. In five years the Bush administration would have the government spend $100 billion more annually than was proposed by the Clinton administration. But for some people, no amount will ever be enough.
“Neither the administration nor Congress treats the war [on terrorism] as a reason to accelerate the rebuilding and reform of the U.S. armed forces,” complain Gary Schmitt and Tom Donnelly of the Project for the New American Century. The editors of National Review argue: “even after last year’s reminder, we are still short-changing defense.”
Charles Revie of the Veterans Voting Block worries about “our neglected military” and warns against allowing “our military to deteriorate.” Without more defense spending we might lose “control of the most dangerous world situation we have faced in many years,” argues historian Fred Kagan.
One wonders what world such people think they live in. America’s great Cold War antagonist, the Soviet Union, is gone, along with its gaggle of eastern European allies. Russia has now joined with NATO in a cooperative relationship that could not have been dreamed of a decade ago.
Inter-superpower competition has disappeared from the Third World, as America has become the only game in town. Vietnam is talking about leasing Camh Ranh Bay to the United States.
South Korea far outranges the North, possessing an economy 40 times as strong and a population twice as big. Japan is the world’s second-ranking economic power, capable of playing a key role in constraining potential Chinese adventurism. India is expanding its role on the world stage as both a significant military power and friend of America.
Potential adversaries of America are pitiful and few–Cuba, Iraq, North Korea. Only the threat of terrorism is significant and dangerous, but it is highly diffuse and not amenable to solution through manifold army divisions, navy carrier groups, and abundant air wings. Indeed, emphasizing traditional military assets risks diverting attention from the reformed forces and less meddlesome foreign policy necessary to respond.
The fundamental issue is foreign policy, not military outlays. For defense spending is the price of one’s foreign policy.
Consider the scenario spun by attorney Adam Mersereau in National Review Online to justify “restoring the American military to its former glory after the crippling cutbacks that occurred under President Clinton”: if we deploy troops onto Iraqi soil for the purposes of destroying its military, ousting its government, and installing a new one, almost anything can happen. The Arab and/or Muslim worlds could unite against us. Saudi Arabia and Egypt could express their indignation by blocking the Suez or other vital shipping lanes. Iran, Syria, and others could take to the battlefield in support of their Muslim brethren. The Palestinians could ignite another hot war with Israel. Arafat could be martyred. China might avail itself of America’s distraction by invading Taiwan, and North Korea could make a similar move on South Korea.
Mersereau’s nightmare suggests a good reason for not attacking Iraq. Anyway, virtually nothing in his scenario addresses the defense of the United States. And America’s friends don’t need American aid.
Iraq is a nasty actor, but is not the only thuggish state that violates human rights and might like to develop weapons of mass destruction; in any case, it can be deterred, as it has for the last decade, without war. Even if Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria turned hostile, they could not stand against the United States. Israel possesses overwhelming military strength. South Korea vastly overmatches the North on virtually every measure of national power. Taiwan is strong, and China lacks the capability to cross the Taiwan Strait.
Thus Mersereau’s lurid fantasy doesn’t even justify maintaining America’s existing force structure, let alone adding to it. Indeed, few of Washington’s current deployments are devoted to genuine defense.
The 100,000 soldiers in Europe, and especially the more than 11,000 on station in the Balkans, are wasted on nonexistent dangers and peripheral interests. Europe faces no threat and, with an economy and population greater than America’s, is well able to arm for the future. Settling multiple Balkans civil wars is irrelevant to American security.
Japan’s Security
Japan similarly faces no imminent security threat and can adopt a more vigorous defense policy. Regional squeamishness is no excuse for Asia’s most vibrant power not to do more to protect itself and its neighbors.
Deploying 37,000 soldiers in South Korea is a waste. Seoul is eminently capable of deterring the decaying regime in the North. It should not be Washington’s job to offer a permanent defense subsidy to the South, especially given how the world has changed since 1950.
The closest to a traditional military threat is China. Yet Beijing remains poor and its military remains weak. China is a potential peer competitor in the future, but not soon. Anyway, it is likely to threaten American predominance in East Asia, not vital security interests closer to home. The countries that should respond are the East Asians.
Other countries that fear Beijing should do more on their own behalf. If the disputed Spratly Islands matter to the Philippines, Manila needs to create a military to assert its interests, rather than expect Americans to ride to the rescue.
No country since Rome has possessed America’s dominance. The United States plus its allies and friends account for about 80 percent of all military spending. Washington spends as much as the next eight countries combined, six of which are allies. Friendly countries like Israel and Taiwan each spend as much as America’s few true enemies combined.
Yet fearmongers want Washington to do even more. One wonders if advocates of a bigger military will be satisfied as long as anyone outside the American coalition spends anything on defense.
But with the collapse of the primary threat, hegemonic communism, and rise of the allied response, through populous and prosperous Asian and European friends, America need no longer intervene everywhere to protect everyone.
The United States should maintain the world’s strongest military, but not one disproportionately large–especially when September 11 revealed that the most serious threats against America are unconventional, requiring a very different response from the Cold War policy.
The lesson of September 11 is not that Washington should mindlessly lavish money on the military, but that it should adjust its foreign policy to more accurately reflect American security interests. Once it does so, it can cut military outlays, spending money more wisely and effectively.
Doug Bandow, a nationally syndicated columnist, is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and the author and editor of several books.
