In this series, Dr. Carson examines the connection between ideology and the revolutions of our time and traces the impact on several major countries and the spread of the ideas and practices around the world.
This story is said to have been told by a man who served as a tour guide in and around Detroit, Michigan. One day he was assigned to show Ford’s River Rouge plant to a group of visiting Russian engineers. The guide noted that they were soon in a jovial mood, laughing, talking, and generally in a festive spirit. Just as they passed the huge parking lot filled with cars, they became even more animated than usual. The one who spoke the best English addressed this question to the guide:
“Do they prepare themselves like this to impress all their visitors? Or is it just for us?”
“What do you mean?” the guide asked.
“The impressive number of cars. It’s a flattering illustration of Ford’s capacity for production.” The guide pointed out that Ford would hardly have arranged such a display since the cars were used and some of them were old. Moreover, the visitors must have already observed that there were many cars in the United States. But his answer did not satisfy the Russian. “Then to whom do they belong?” “To the people who work at the plant and in the offices. Workers.” “You’re kidding,” he said, “so many cars?”
The guide explained that many of the Ford employees owned their own cars. The Russian declared that such a notion was typical propaganda. There was a way to prove it, the guide said. It would only be necessary to ask workers to whom they would talk on the assembly line whether they owned cars or not. But that would prove nothing, the Russian maintained.
“We know that old trick. The plant is well prepared for their visit. Every worker has learned by heart how to answer our questions. Unless he wants to be fired or arrested he’ll have to give the proper answer.”
All right, if asking them in the plant would not prove anything, why not wait until the shifts changed, and as a worker approached his car, ask him whose it was? But the Russian was only amused:
“What do you take me for?” he asked, “an idiot? It’s simple to stage such a show. I don’t hold Americans for bunglers. If you do something, you do it well. You are a big nation, and you know how to deal with other nations.”’
Nothing could convince the Russian that it was not a show staged for the benefit of the visiting engineers.
Variations on this story have been told a good many times. It is sometimes told to illustrate the disparity between the material condition of Soviet workers and those in the United States. That is undoubtedly an important point, but it is not the one to be emphasized here. It may also be told to call attention to the fact that tours in the Soviet Union have for many years had a carefully arranged itinerary through areas prepared in advance to provide a good impression to visitors. This brings us somewhat nearer the point, but does not begin to comprehend all that is involved in it.
A Massive Propaganda Effort
What is involved is an attempt to grasp the impact of an idea which has had the Russian Empire in its grip for about sixty years. That impact is by no means easily understood. Our understanding of any complex development, or of anything, for that matter, is always partial and incomplete. In the best of circumstances, our vision is impaired by the limitations of the angle we are taking, by our inclination to put new wine into old bottles, i.e., to fit the new experience into the confines of what we already knew, and by the tendency to put the best or the worst face on a thing. But these usual obstacles to understanding are greatly augmented in the case of the Soviet Union by a massive propaganda effort and by a concerted deliberate effort to conceal the truth.
Communism has been deliberately hidden behind a facade, a more extensive facade than has ever been erected before, a facade of such dimensions that the parable with which this article begins may have actually occurred, either once or many times. That is, the Russian people are familiar with such an extensive facade that they could actually imagine that Ford Motor Company would arrange an immense spectacle of automobiles to deceive a few obscure visiting engineers.
Facade vs. Reality
There are two common ways of misinterpreting the facade. One is the obvious mistaking of the facade for the reality of communism. The literature on Soviet Communism abounds with examples of people who returned from visits to Russia and wrote favorable accounts of what they saw, accounts whose credibility depended upon accepting the facade for the whole reality. The other misinterpretation comes from those who have grasped the dimensions of the facade and perceive the gigantic hypocrisy which has produced it. Such hypocrisy, they tend to conclude, can only mean that communism is only a sham, that Communists are hypocrites hiding their lust for power behind an ideological mask.
There is a goodly amount of literature, produced mainly in the last decade or so, which offers much inferential evidence in support of this interpretation. Nonetheless, those who draw this conclusion have got the matter wrong-end-to. They are looking at the effect and are mistaking it for the cause. The facade is an effect; so are the power opportunities. The love of power resides in every breast, dormant or active; the lust for power is an effect of opportunities to wield it without let or hindrance. Communist ideology is not a mask; it is a cause. It is the cause which has produced the above effects. Before explaining why, how, and in what ways the facade is an effect, however, it is in order to explore the dimensions of the facade in the Soviet Union.
The Several Soviet Governmental Fronts
The government of the Soviet Union is a facade. An elaborate governmental structure exists in the Soviet Union, a structure which bears no relation to decision making and very little to the exercise of power. In theory, the power of government is vested in the Supreme Soviet, which is composed of a Council of the Union and a Council of Nationalities. Members are elected by universal suffrage, and more than 90 per cent of those eligible usually vote. When the Supreme Soviet is not in session, which is most of the time, its legislative functions are supposed to be performed by an executive body, called a Presidium. What could be more democratic?
Except that the Supreme Soviet is only a facade, window dressing, so to speak. It merely approves the decisions that have already been made. There is usually only one candidate for office, and he (or she) has been selected by the powers that be. In reality, there is no impact upon the government from the populace. Actual power is supposed to be wielded by the Communist Party, whose membership over the years has ranged from, say, 2 million members upwards toward 10 million. There is an elaborate structure of party organization from bottom to top which parallels that of the formal government. But the Party is not a decision making institution; it is a decision executing institution. The way it works has been described by a historian thusly (He refers to the Stalin Era, but much the same could be said for the whole period of Communist rule.):
Huge as it was, the Communist party entrusted its authority to a Central Committee of some seventy or more…. Directing the labors of the Committee, and indeed of the mighty USSR as a whole, was the party Politburo, called the Presidium after 1952, usually of about sixteen men and women. This powerful, self-perpetuating institution responded in the final analysis to the will and whims of the arbitrary despot, Joseph Stalin.2
It should be clear, then, that the governmental structure involves not one facade but a series of facades in a row, as it were, each lower in visibility or height as it is looked at from front to back but greater in power. Popular elections are entirely facade, the most visible and the least substantial of the facades. The Supreme Soviet, the “parliament,” is a front which exercises no real power. Its Presidium technically wields power, but it is actually a mechanism to be manipulated by those further behind the scenes. The Party, too, is a facade, in that it is a symbol of rather than the real source of power. Even the Politburo, or Party Presidium, has sometimes been mainly a facade, for its members have been subject to the will of the single man in charge.
The Role of the Party
Nonetheless, the Party is most important. He who can speak for the Party, i.e., lay down the Party line, rules the Soviet Union. The Party is not so much the base of power, though in periods when there is a contest for dominance within the Politburo it may sometimes have been, but it is always the ideological arm of power. As one man becomes dominant, his base of power becomes his control of all armed force, especially the secret police, for through them he controls all else. But all this-hinges on control over the Party, which is a way of saying that it depends upon making the “correct” interpretation of ideology.
Lenin’s greatest invention was of the facade of party rule. He did not, of course, invent party rule, for that had existed in England, say, before Karl Marx was even born. Party rule in England is a device for rule by majority, and the party claims its right to rule on the basis of popular election and ability to obtain majorities on key issues in the House of Commons.
Communists neither necessarily have nor do they claim to rule by majorities. The Communist Party is not a political party in the accepted or expected sense. It does not claim to be a part; it claims to be the whole. That is, it claims to act for all those who have any right to rule, i.e., the proletariat, the peasants, or whoever. It claims this right on the basis of ideology. It acts not by majorities but in unison and under strict discipline. The Party is a facade; the reality is ideology, and the personification of reality is the one man, and there can only be one man, who can set forth the correct interpretation of ideology. Every member of the Party must then accept this line or be subject to expulsion, or worse. Such party rule is now the norm in many parts of the world. It is rule by an idea.
Constitutions Used to Promote Communism
Communism operates, too, behind a cover of words. It may be that the best place to examine this facade is in the Soviet constitutions. There have been several such documents. The first was promulgated in 1918, the second in 1924, and probably the most ambitious in 1936. They are in form constitutions, in content ideological, and, in fact, facades.
In form, a constitution sets forth the power of the government, who is to exercise the powers of government, may prescribe limitations on the power, and lays down the procedures by which the government is to operate. A constitution may affirm certain rights as belonging to the people as well as those that inhere in the limitations on the government. The Soviet constitutions appear to do most of these things. They describe a governmental structure, tell how it is to operate, and set forth certain rights belonging to approved classes, or to the people generally.
But all this is misleading. One writer attempts to get around this fact by ascribing a different purpose to the Soviet constitution than that of traditional ones. He says, “In the Soviet Union, the Constitution . . . is regarded far more as a symbol or summary of the existing structure of government than as an immutable blueprint; it is descriptive rather than prescriptive. . . .”3 To which it must be replied that the constitutions are not very accurate as descriptions, either, but, if they were, we would still say that something which purports to be a constitution and is not prescriptive is not a constitution.
A Class Document
The Soviet Constitutions are ideological in content. The first one was professedly a class document. “Members of the so-called exploiting classes—businessmen, monks and priests. . . , police agents of the old regime . . .—were disfranchised and denied the right to hold office.” More, “The Bill of Rights was restated in class terms. Freedom of speech, of press, association, of assembly, and of access to education was to be reserved to the working class. . . .”4 They are ideological, too, in prescribing duties as well as rights. But they are ideological in the deepest sense in that they are neither faithful descriptions of the actual situation nor enforceable prescriptions of what should be; they are formal statements of the stages in history of the Communist Revolution in Russia at particular times.
The constitutions are facades. Neither the workers, nor any other class or group enjoy freedom of speech, press, association, or religion in the Soviet Union. There are no independent powers to contain or limit the exercise of power. The Constitution of 1924 declared that the member republics had an inalienable right to secede from the Soviet Union, but, as Stalin had said, “the demand for secession…at the present stage of the revolution [has become] a profoundly counterrevolutionary one.“5 In short, secession was a right, but it could not be permitted. The first two constitutions did not even acknowledge the role of the Party in government. The Constitution of 1936 did ascribe a role to the Party, but it did not expose it fully. The nature of the facades erected by constitutions is well described in this summary by a scholar:
The Soviet regime has demonstrated great skill in using the trappings of mass democracy to mask the entrenched position of the dictatorial elite which dominates Soviet society. Constitutional myths and symbols have been ingeniously adapted to contribute to the illusion of mass control. But the actual configurations of power in the system are difficult to conceal. The political realities of Soviet life speak the unmistakable language of one-party dictatorship in which ultimate power is deposited in a narrow ruling group in the Kremlin.6
Sometimes even traditional branches of the government are largely facade. So it is with the diplomatic and consular services. According to expert testimony, they serve mainly to provide intelligence information and promote espionage in foreign lands. “Furthermore, the majority of personnel in Soviet embassies abroad are KGB [the “regular secret police”] and GRU [military secret police] employees. The proportion of KGB staff officers to the rest of Soviet embassy personnel is usually two men out of five. GRU staff officers number one man in five.”7 There is abundant testimony, too, that even cleaning women serve as spies, and that all personnel in an embassy are subject to the control of the secret police.
The Church as a Front, Churchmen as Spies
Perhaps the strangest facade of all is that of the Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union. It is strange because the Communist Party vowed from the beginning to root out and destroy the remains of religion. The power of the government was vigorously used for many years, is still used, against religion. Party members may not be churchgoers; in general, those who have any position or status avoid the outward practice of religion. Churches, monasteries, and all sorts of religious establishment have been closed on a vast scale. Parents were forbidden to teach religion to their children. Priests and ministers have been persecuted. None of this succeeded in stifling religion in the Soviet Union. But the Communists have followed another tack, have done so more or less from the beginning. They have attempted to penetrate and subvert the churches, most notably the Orthodox Church, to use the churches, so far as possible, for their own ends.
One way the Church serves as a facade is by the hierarchy giving vocal support for the regime. Hedrick Smith says: “Patriarch Pimen and other Orthodox prelates make obligatory speeches praising Soviet policy at home and abroad. The Church donates millions of rubles to the Soviet Peace Committee and other Communist causes.”8 Another writer states the case more directly:
The Church is subject to the guidance of the State Council for Religious Affairs, which can overrule the Patriarch (the ruling bishop) or any Church authority on any issue, religious or secular. The council exacts huge “contributions” from the Church treasury for various causes, and compels Church elders to lend their presence to state occasions, particularly large receptions in the Kremlin to which foreigners are invited.9
Robert G. Kaiser gives examples of how high churchmen present a facade to newsmen to conceal the actual situation. These examples came out in a press conference. The Metropolitan declared to the assembled press that “The State does not interfere with the Church.” In support of his view, he proclaimed that the Church was publishing many new Bibles. As it turned out, it had published 80,000 in 20 years, 4,000 per year for from 30 to 50 million believers. Those who attended the conference were each presented with a set of long playing records which contained reproductions of the singing of much of the Church liturgy. “The state record monopoly made the album, but it has never been sold to the public. It is a special edition, made for the Church to hand out on occasions like this one.”¹º
Considerable evidence has been accumulated that churchmen are often used as spies by the secret police, and that some of them may actually be members of the secret police. The Reverend Richard Wurmbrand testified in this fashion before a Congressional committee:
If you tell me that somebody is an official pastor in a Rumanian or a Russian church, I know that he is an informer of the Communist authorities. Without this, you can’t be.
On Sunday you preach. On Monday you can be called to the so-called representative of the Government Council for the Affairs of the Religious Cults, and you are obliged to answer the questions: “Who has been in your church?” They don’t care about these old ones. “What Youth has been in church?” “Who is a soulwinner?” If they have confessed something, “What have they confessed?” “Who is zealous in prayer?” “What are their political attitudes?”¹¹
To the same effect, though much less dramatically, Kaiser says, “According to believers in Moscow, the hierarchy is riddled with agents and informers. . .”12 In this manner, the Communists attempt to transform the churches into a facade.
Equality for Women
Facades abound in Soviet Communism. Perhaps the most ubiquitous facade is equality. Women are supposed to be equal with men. It is supposed to be a land without special privilege, where even top Party officials receive only modest salaries. Inhabitants of rural areas are in theory equal to city dwellers. Though this facade is not well maintained, a good deal of energy goes into creating the appearance of equality. Politburo members often dress plainly and affect simple tastes. Yet, behind the scenes, privilege is the order of the day, indeed, there is such an intricate array of privileges that it requires considerable study to get to know them. Party members are, of course, privileged over the general citizenry. The secret police have their own special stores where they can buy goods not available to the general populace.
In one sense, women are equal to men, in the sense of working as hard as do men, or harder. One writer says that “there has appeared in the streets of Communist cities a strange creature whom people speak of as a ‘working woman.’ You can see her on cranes, in railroad yards, at the heaviest construction sites, in mines, on highway building jobs, etc.”¹³ But if she is married her “equality” surely adds to her burdens. “The chronically low level of the material sphere of life usually necessitates employment by both parties to the marriage, but the woman still has to care for her home and children. In such circumstances, the woman’s life becomes in effect a kind of penal servitude of early rising, working in an office or factory from nine to five, standing in line for groceries. . . , doing the housecleaning. . . , preparing meals for her husband and children in moments of paralyzing exhaustion.”14 The facade of equality often masks a brutalizing inequality.
Privileges for Leaders
The special privileges of the leaders are at least partially hidden behind a variety of facades. Here is one brief description of how the system works:
License plates beginning with MOC belong to members and staff of the Party’s Central Committee, and illegal left turns are one of the privileges that accrue to such citizens. They come to Granovskovo Street to collect more special privileges—food and clothing sold in a special store open only to them. The store is hidden behind a door marked BUREAU OF SPECIAL PASSES. . . . Granovskovo Street is usually lined with chauffeur-driven cars waiting for their official proprietors to come out of the store. Most of the customers emerge carrying nondescript packages wrapped in brown paper.15
Their special privileges are much more extensive, of course, but this one example exposes the character of the facade.
There is a great difference between life in the major cities and that in small cities and rural areas. A part of the communist facade is of a modernized, industrialized land with giant hydro-electric dams, huge steel and oil industries, large mechanized state farms, clean subway systems, and so on. Hedrick Smith reported this description by a Russian of actual conditions:
“On the stronger, larger state farms not far from Moscow or Leningrad, or those built for show. . . , conditions are better in every way—stone buildings, separate apartments for each working family, a sewage system, running water. This was the way it was on the first two state farms where I worked. They were each about an hour from Leningrad. But the third state farm was further out—about two hours. It was a weak farm. Wooden buildings. It lacked all conveniences. No central heating system. No sewage system. No running water. The greatest problem on all three was the lack of meat. There was almost none. As far as other food goes, the closer to Leningrad, the more the stores were selling. The further from Leningrad, the less they were selling. That was the rule. Apples you could get. But oranges, tangerines—only in Leningrad.”16
Why all these, and other, facades? Why erect elaborate governmental structures that do not govern? Why the pretense of democracy? Why have extensive electoral campaigns when the results of the election are a foregone conclusion? Why bother to tally the votes when the electorate have no choice? Why have written constitutions when they neither inhibit those who rule nor assure any benefits to the ruled? Why would an atheist regime attempt to have a church serve as a facade? Why does the regime maintain a facade of equality when everywhere great inequities prevail? Why create model kindergartens, model state farms, model collective farms, and even model prisons, as the Soviet Union does? In short, why erect facade after facade at such tremendous effort and expense? Who are these supposed to impress?
To Impress Visitors
It is widely believed that these facades, as they are being called here, are erected mainly to impress foreigners and conceal from them Soviet reality. Undoubtedly, this is one of the reasons for which some of the facade building takes place. For example the facade of freedom of religion presented by high churchmen is clearly for foreign consumption. Surely, too, the facade of a diplomatic service which conceals alien secret police is created for its effect on foreigners. Model farms, and such like, probably have as one of their reasons for being the impression of visitors to the Soviet Union.
It has always been important to the Soviet Union, too, to create a favorable impression on foreigners (though often enough they have not succeeded in this). The communist “experiment” was first undertaken on a large scale in Russia. A Communist International was organized by Lenin to spread communism around the world. The success of this movement would surely depend, to some extent, on at least the apparent success of communism in Russia. If communism was to be “the wave of the future,” that future would surely need to look attractive if others were to be drawn to it.
But why facades? Why not present the actuality of the Soviet Union to the world? The answer to this question is so obvious, that it may have been unnecessary to pose it: The Soviet “achievement” has not been such as would be likely to favorably impress peoples from many parts of the world. The Soviet reality, at its nether reaches, is such that it repels decent people. The Soviet Union could only take a place among the governments of the world by creating a facade of democracy, of constitutionality, and of having something like a parliamentary system. If its gangster-like actions were not concealed by facades, it would be incumbent on people generally to recognize it for what it is.
For Home Consumption, The Illusion of Success
But the facades are not just for the benefit of foreigners. They are for the inhabitants of the Soviet Union as well. How, it may be asked, can they be for the people who are unlikely to be fooled for long as to the nature of the regime and of conditions under which they live? It is possible, however, to be impressed by facades even if one is not misled by them. Millions of Americans have been thrilled, and horrified, by films about catastrophes even though they know they are not witnessing actual catastrophes. It is impressive that the Communist Party can garner an almost unanimous vote from the Russian electorate, even though the election is rigged, so to speak. The creation of such elaborate and extensive facades may be a more impressive demonstration of power than would the feeding of the poor, say.
But these explanations are surface explanations. Underlying them are deeper reasons which account for the continued, prolific, and pervasive facades. Communism is a deception. Efforts to impose it can only be maintained by erecting facade after facade. Facade is the natural fruit of deception. Communist ideology cannot produce the freedom that it proclaims, the democracy that it claims, the concerted effort that it seeks, nor the transformed man that it wills. Marxian ideology, on which it is based, is a kind of poetic vision of man, society, economics, and life which does not now, never did, and there is no reason to believe ever will, exist. All the efforts to bring it into being result in something quite different from what is sought. It is only possible to create illusions that it works; these illusions we can experience as facades.
A Conspiracy
Communism is not basically a social system, an economic system, or even a political system; it is basically a conspiracy. It evinces itself to the world as a conspiracy to gain, hold, and wield power to effect a great transformation. But in its inwards, so to speak, it is a conspiracy to deceive and an agreement to be deceived. It is, I say, a deception. Who does it deceive? The answer is this: Communism is a conspiracy to deceive all who need to be deceived by it. All who accept it, work to apply it, aid it in any way, or on whom it is being imposed, need to be deceived. Even those most deeply involved in creating the deception need to be deceived. Indeed, they have the greatest need to be deceived, because they have the greatest need to believe in it.
The members of the Politburo, or Presidium, have the greatest need to be deceived. They stand at the pinnacle of power in the Soviet Union because they are the ones charged with the task and who are supposed to know how to usher in communism. That it can be achieved is essential to their hold on power and position. They need to believe that they are concerting all effort toward achieving their goals. They need to believe that the workers, peasants, and intellectuals are solidly behind them. They need to believe that religion is dying out, that the young are committed to communism, and that communism is conferring great benefits on the people. They need to believe, above all, that socialism works and that they are approaching the final stage of communism.
Fooling the Leaders
A situation is created for the top men that enables them very nearly to believe all this. This is the role of the special privileges which they enjoy. They live in and around Moscow which has the best of everything in Russia. And they have the best of the best: the finest cars, the most exclusive dachas, the choicest foods, the most sumptuous beach houses in the Crimea, and fly in the most modern of jet planes. As Kaiser observes, “Privileges insulate those at the very top, a tiny group of perhaps only two or three dozen men, from all the harassments and discomforts of an ordinary citizen’s life.” “In sum,” he says, “they live in a contrived environment. Even their vodka is better than the ordinary man’s.”17
But there is much more to their contrived environment than these special privileges. In a sense, most Russians are engaged in a giant conspiracy to prove that socialism, or communism, works. The quotas of production that are supposed to be filled are a part of that unwitting conspiracy. (Even prisoners in slave labor camps learned to exaggerate their output in order to survive.) The shoddy goods which are produced to fill quotas promote the conspiracy, for on the statistical sheets viewed by the Politburo they are not described as shoddy. The whole massive propaganda program enables those who will to believe in communism.
Fooling the World
The need to be deceived spreads outward from the Politburo in concentric circles to reach finally to the whole world. The members of the Party in the Soviet Union need to be deceived, even as they are contriving to bring off the deception. Communist parties around the world need to be deceived. “Fellow-travelers” of the communist movement around the world need to be deceived. Indeed, all who wish to be need to be deceived, and all who will make sufficient effort can be. The whole paraphernalia of facades exists to assist them in the effort.
Whether or not the deceivers are actually deceived by their deceptions is somewhat beside the point. The point is that such a fabric of deception is created, entailing a vast conspiracy to bring it off, that reality is sufficiently distorted so as to make it difficult to determine what is real and what not. When the truth is sufficiently distorted and obscured, men may believe what they wish. The purpose of the deception is adequately achieved when those who need to believe are enabled to do so by it. There is a human tendency, communism aside, for men to believe what they want to believe. There is an even stronger tendency for men to believe what they have a strong need to believe.
Widespread Deception, Widespread Cynicism
Communists have built facade upon facade in the Soviet Union to assist any who will, and all who need to, to believe that communism works and is the wave of the future. Of course, one of the results of such widespread deception may be an equally widespread cynicism. The Soviet engineers, in the anecdote which opens this article, could not believe that the huge number of automobiles outside the Ford plant had not been assembled just to impress them. This meant also, of course, that they did not believe many of the spectacles created in the Soviet Union. But they pretend to believe them when they are at home, which may be almost as useful as actually believing. Such pretense undoubtedly degrades them, but degraded men are essential to corrupt systems. The success of the facades depends upon a conspiracy of degraded men.
Behind the facades, however, is a grim and brutal reality. It is the reality of terror on which the power of the rulers of the Soviet Union rests, a terror so extensive that for many years those who tried to tell the world of it were not believed.
Next: 7. The Reign of Terror.
—FOOTNOTES—
1Leopold Tyrmand, Notebooks of a Dilettante (New York: Macmillan, 1970), pp. 85-87.
2Arthur J. May, Europe Since 1939 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 193.
3Alfred G. Meyer, The Soviet Political System (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 199.
4Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 353.
5Ibid., p. 367.
6lbid., pp. 384-85.
70leg Penkovskiy, The Penkovskiy Papers (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), p. 66. 8Hedrick Smith, The Russians (New York: Quadrangle, 1976), p. 436.
9Robert G. Kaiser, Russia (New York: Atheneum, 1976), p. 105.
10Ibid., p. 106.
11Hearing, House Committee on Un-American Activities, August 10, 1967 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 535.
12Kaiser, op. cit., p. 105.
13Leopold Tyrmand, The Rosa Luxemburg Contraceptive Cooperative (New York: Macmillan, 1972), p. 80.
14Ibid., pp. 82-83.
15Kaiser, op. cit., p. 176.
16Smith, op. cit., p. 204.
17Kaiser, op. cit., pp. 177-78.
