Dr. Merrill is Professor of Journalism at the University of Missouri.
A growing assortment of individuals in the United States, strange as it may seem calling themselves liberals or libertarians, are insisting that not enough viewpoints and opinions are making their way into the American press. They are convinced that minority opinions are not getting their fair and proper hearing, and they feel that if the country’s newspapers will not act responsibly in this area, they should be forced to do so. Many of them, spouting the platitudes of the Hutchins Commission Report of 1947, advocate judicial and legislative stimulants to their kind of pluralistic press.
One of this number, Jerome A. Barron, an associate professor of law at George Washington University, has proposed (Harvard Law Review, June, 1967) an interpretation of the First Amendment which imposes upon the press an affirmative responsibility to publish minority views, and he would, for example, support legislation which would force newspapers to print letters-to-the-editor from minorities. Professor Barron is rather typical of the new breed of “press directors” acting in the name of social responsibility.
If one looks at this complex issue as having to do only with assuring minority opinions a fair hearing, it is little wonder that a proposal like Professor Barron’s would be considered salutary and long overdue.
This, however, is not where the problem ends. If such a proposal were taken seriously by enough powerful people in the United States to bring it into practice, a whole bag of new troubles would be opened to plague the person concerned about protecting the free press. Even as “freedom of the press” implies to many the freedom to be heard—a freedom for the consumer, we must not forget that it also implies the freedom to print or not to print—a freedom for the publisher.
The First Amendment provides that the government will not pass any laws which abridge press freedom. Although press freedom is not defined in the Bill of Rights, an explicit concern with not passing laws which might diminish press freedom appears to be quite clear. When any group—even government seeking to remedy certain ills which it believes it detects—tells a publisher what he must print, it is taking upon itself an omnipotence and paternalism which is not far removed from authoritarianism. It is restricting press freedom in the name of freedom to read. The next step is to tell the publisher what he shall not print.
This paradox (in confusing press freedom with freedom to read) is one of the chief causes for the continuing controversy. It is my belief that “freedom of the press” is not the same thing as “freedom of information.” It is obvious that the press can have freedom to print anything it desires without making available to the reader everything it has available to print. Its freedom, in other words, imposes an implicit restriction on the reader’s freedom to have access to every bit of information or point of view.
Looking at it in this way, it is not difficult to see that press freedom does not imply freedom of information. The latter term refers to the right of the reader to have all material available for reading, while the former term denotes the right of the publisher to publish or not to publish without external compulsion.
The Publisher’s Freedom
“Freedom of the press” obviously means many things. Its meaning is determined by the particular context and by the particular person using it. The publisher, for example, stresses the freedom of the press concept, while the reader, seeking in vain for his viewpoint or orientation in certain newspapers, stresses the freedom of information concept. The government official who attempts to keep certain information from press has his own definition: the newspaper has a right to print something if it can get it—a kind of “freedom to print” but not necessarily a “freedom to get” concept.
Perhaps we try to make the term “freedom of the press” cover too much—to include all the above concepts and others besides. If we were to understand it narrowly, in the sense clearly indicated by its syntax, we would emphasize the press and its freedom to determine what it will and will not print and to make this determination without interference. This would appear to be at the heart of the term, and those who talk of readers’ opinions and viewpoints being ignored or under stressed would seem to be referring to something other than “freedom of the press.”
I like to think about press freedom as freedom belonging to the press. Other types of freedom are important, too, but let us stick to the press’s freedom when we are talking about “press freedom.” The press alone, in this view, would be in the position of determining what it would or would not print. The press would have no prior restrictions on its editorial prerogatives; this would be press freedom.
Those who favor an interpretation of the First Amendment that protects “freedom of information” or some right of the people “to know” will not like this definition, of course, for they see it as too narrow. They should be reminded, however, that the First Amendment covers their territory of interest also with its provisions of free speech, free assembly, free religious worship, and the like.
But where, someone will ask, is the right of people to read and to hear? If “freedom of the press” implies the right of the people to read what they want to read, “freedom of speech” must also imply the right of the people to listen to what they want to listen to. Since there is “freedom of speech,” I therefore have a “right” to have available to my ears all viewpoints from all possible minorities. Absurd! How can anyone seriously believe that one kind of freedom assumes another kind of right?
Rule by Minority
The vision of a better journalistic world through coercive publishing rests mainly on the assumption that important minority viewpoints are not being made known in the United States, and that this is deleterious to a democratic society. Although this main premise is not systematically challenged in this article, it seems incumbent on those who advocate controlled access to name some of the important minority positions that are not being publicized by the American press. The assumption appears to be always floating around that the American public is not getting to know about important information and ideas of the utmost importance. The press, of course, is generally the villain. I have the feeling, contrary to the above assumption, that most Americans get far more from their newspapers and magazines than they want.
The person who is concerned about what is not in the press does not appear to be primarily concerned about the freedom of the press; rather he seems disturbed that every possible bit of information is not available everywhere for everybody. His concern, while perhaps “noble” in itself, is fabulously unrealistic and naive. In addition, this person must certainly recognize that his position is potentially authoritarian, just as the existing freedom of the press to discriminate (which he bemoans) is potentially restrictive.
The Good to Society vs. Social Responsibility
He who would compel publication justifies his position by using terms such as “social responsibility of the press” and “the reader’s inherent right to know.” He, in other words, puts what he considers the good to society above what the individual publisher considers to be his right of editorial self-determination.
Few sincere and concerned persons would quarrel with the position that “the good to society” or “social responsibility” are laudable concepts which should be served by the press. However, trouble comes when these theoretical concepts are applied to the actual workings of the press in society. The what of the concept presents considerable difficulty: What, for instance, is the best way to do the most good to society, and what is the best way to be socially responsible? There are many who would feel very strongly that forcing minority opinions (especially “certain” ones) into a newspaper would be very harmful to the “social good,” and that this would be the epitome of social irresponsibility.
Who Shall Decide?
The how of the concept adds further complications. How will decisions be made about what shall or shall not be printed? What would be a rational manner of making such determinations if we are to take them out of the hands of individual publishers and editors? A Federal court? A Federal ombudsman? An FPA (Federal Press Agency) organized on the lines of the Federal Communications Commission?
From among all the “minority” positions in a given community or in the nation, which ones would have a “right” to be published and which ones would not? Which spokesman for any one “minority” would be published as representative of the whole minority? Or would all of them — or many of them — be published, since undoubtedly there is a pluralism in minority opinions even on a single issue? These are basic and important questions—questions which would certainly plague the authority which would have to make such decisions.
Minority viewpoints which one authoritative body would deem valuable and thus worthy of publication might, to another authoritative body that is equally sincere and perspicacious, seem inane, irrational, or otherwise lacking in value. Undoubtedly, even among the stanchest advocates of minority rights, there is preference for some minorities over others. Some persons, for instance, would find the views of the Congress of Racial Equality more to their liking than, say, those of the John Birch Society or the Ku Klux Klan. Presumably, if persons with such preferences were members of the determining body, the minority views of the latter two “minority” groups would find it rather difficult to get “equal” treatment.
Beyond this, there is another rather perplexing and closely related problem. What emphasis should various minority views receive in the press, or even in a single newspaper? Would this be decided by the proportion of the total population which the “minority” under consideration comprises? Would it be decided on the basis of the “worth” or “intrinsic value to society” of the viewpoint espoused? If so, how would such worth be ascertained? Would it be decided on the basis of the economic or political pressure which a particular “minority” group might bring to bear on the power structure? One is tempted to suspect that this would probably be the case.
What View Shall Prevail?
This brings us to another question. To some it may not appear to be important, but it certainly would cry out very quickly for an answer under a coercive-printing system. This is the question of defining a “minority” group or a “minority” viewpoint. Just what is a minority in the sense of seriously considering the forced publication of its opinions or positions? Just as the majority is composed of many minorities, there are minorities within minorities. How does one determine which of these minorities should be heard? Or are they all to be heard with equal force? Or, said in another way, just how do we get at the minority opinion?
Many persons will reply that these are unimportant and theoretical questions that should not be permitted to interfere with the serious consideration of a forced-publication system. Sure, they will say, there will be problems and weaknesses, but let us not be reactionary; let us push on in spite of obstacles toward a New Journalism in which all opinions receive equal and just airing and no minority group can feel slighted by the treatment it receives in the press. This is a beautiful and idealistic aim, indeed, but one which only the most detached and naive person could possibly envision as being achieved.
In conclusion, it seems safe to say that a forced-publishing system will take root only when our society has proceeded much farther along the road toward Orwell’s 1984, wherein a paternalistic and omnipotent Power Structure makes our individual decisions for us. And, even then in that wonderland of equality where all opinions will blend deliciously into one big View-Stew, I wouldn’t be surprised if there is not at least one “minority” fretting away somewhere on the sidelines — misunderstood and fighting fiercely to get a greater voice in social affairs. But, then, perhaps it won’t really matter since minorities will not exist and there will only be one surprisingly harmonious and fair majority babbling its one message in a number of interesting ways.
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To Speak, or Not
This is true liberty, when free-born men, Having to advise the public, may speak free, Which he who can, and will, deserves high praise; Who neither can nor will, may hold his peace; What can be juster in a State than this?
EURIPIDES, The Suppliants