All Commentary
Saturday, February 1, 1958

Popular Causes and Unpopular Effects


There is an old story about a perennially re-elected legisla­tor who attributed his lifelong political success to the fact that he had never voted for a tax bill or against an appropriation bill. He had grasped the elementary fact that people dislike paying taxes but like to receive handouts. They enjoy getting something for noth­ing, in other words, and tend to vote for candidates who promise them opportunities to do so.

A quarter century ago most of the world’s leading governments, sorely beset by the practical diffi­culties of economic depression and encouraged by the theoretical blessing of Lord Keynes and his disciples, adopted something like the old legislator’s philosophy. They cast off the “snuffling ortho­doxies and petty taboos” of classi­cal economics and proceeded to give the people what they wanted.

The Popular Causes

Reduce taxes they emphatically did not, but they did the next best thing: they threw as much of the direct burden as possible upon business concerns and individuals in the higher income brackets, the easy targets, the financially vul­nerable and politically defenseless minority. Then they distributed the proceeds under the names of numerous “social programs”: farm subsidies, unemployment compensation, old-age benefits, public housing, and many others.

They sought to strengthen the bargaining position of labor unions in their dealings with em­ployers. They more or less fully accepted responsibility for “full employment,” that is, for keeping business prosperous, or at any rate active.

The keystones of the whole structure were easy money, free spending, and political regulation of various phases of the people’s economic lives.

It would be unrealistic and un­fair to suppose that these meas­ures were inspired solely by dema­gogic considerations of political advantage. To some extent, they arose from genuinely good inten­tions. The economy was function­ing badly. Human beings needed relief. Business recovery needed, or seemed to need, stimulation. Economic institutions that were rightly or wrongly blamed for the collapse appeared to require re­form.

War Is Forever

The semi compulsive nature of the inflationary and regulatory measures of the depression years became even stronger during the war period. If the joint objectives of relief, recovery, and reform had seemed imperative before, winning the war was now even more so. Artificially easy money, huge Treasury deficits, and new forms of economic regimentation were accepted without protest.

Even when the war was over, the situation retained much of its emergency character. Large areas were physically devastated and economically prostrate. The war­time military alliance fell apart, and the “cold war” began. The economic future looked very ob­scure. Under such conditions, the return to economic orthodoxy, the relinquishment of emergency stim­ulants and controls, was rendered doubly difficult.

Moreover, men were tempted to ask, why should the emergency stimulants and controls be relin­quished? Had not economic ortho­doxy broken down in practice? Had it not been superseded by a new economics that made easy money, free spending, and politi­cal controls and regulations the­oretically defensible? Who could quarrel with such manifestly de­sirable objectives as fair prices, adequate housing, full employment, high wages, and security and welfare for all? Why should not the people in their collective capacity, functioning through the State, endeavor to promote these objectives, substituting purpose­ful action for the “economic drift” of the prewar and predepression years?

The Unpopular Effects

Experience is providing some answers. It is being discovered that good intentions are not enough. If good intentions are to accomplish anything, they must be translated into concrete economic measures, and such measures may or may not produce the intended effects. Even if they do, they are almost sure to produce unintended ones as well. Where some groups are benefited, others are hurt. Competition for productive effi­ciency tends to degenerate into a scramble for political favor. Government of, by, and for the people tends to become government of, by, and for pressure groups. The promise of cradle-to-grave secur­ity weakens economic incentive, tends to make men financially ir­responsible and reduce them to the moral level of dependent children. Why should a man strain nerve and muscle to provide for himself, to keep his job, to lay something by for a “rainy day,” to make pro­vision for his old age, to protect his family from want, when a pa­ternal state promises to do these things for him? Every personal financial misfortune, every source of dissatisfaction with one’s eco­nomic lot, tends to become a griev­ance against the State.

Even worse, if possible, is the fact that governments, in their ef­forts to provide the “social serv­ices” demanded of them, are find­ing themselves under insupport­able financial pressure. Taxpayers demand relief while pressure groups demand larger benefits. Despite intermittent campaigns of retrenchment, national budgets rise inexorably to new heights. In some countries, taxpayers simply refuse to bear the burden, and deficits mount. In some, a tempo­rary expedient is found in exorbi­tant drafts on reserves of foreign exchange. In still others, a pre­carious fiscal equilibrium is main­tained by postponing promised tax relief. Almost everywhere, the purchasing power of money de­clines with varying degrees of speed and regularity.

To accelerate the inflationary process, the labor unions whose growth governments have fostered demand higher wages under pain of strikes on such a scale as to cripple whole economies. The wage demands and strike threats in­crease with every rise in the cost of living; and when the wage de­mands are granted, the cost of liv­ing rises again. And to make effec­tive resistance more difficult, re­strictive credit policies can be in­voked only at the risk of precipi­tating business recession and thus colliding with the “full-employ­ment commitment,” perhaps the most cherished of all the “social programs” welfare states espouse.

Intentions and Consequences

When the United States govern­ment undertook to determine what were “fair” prices for farm prod­ucts and to insure that such prices were actually received by farmers, the unintended effects were over­production, underconsumption, the loss of foreign markets, the use of substitutes, the accumulation of surpluses, a governmental “dump­ing” program that involved heavy losses and aroused foreign resent­ment, and a level of farm prices that was certainly unsatisfactory to farmers and probably lower than would have prevailed in free markets.

When the government tried to protect tenants against high hous­ing costs by retaining rent con­trols after the war, the unintended effects were that new building and even normal maintenance were discouraged, the housing shortage was prolonged, and people were obliged for years to live in anti­quated structures.

When the government inter­vened in the interests of “adequate” housing, the construction industry and its suppliers were overloaded, building costs rose to unprecedented heights, and it be­came virtually impossible to pro­vide housing for low-income fami­lies except by outright subsidies.

When the government decided that the unionization of workers should be encouraged and pro­tected by law, it initiated the growth of a colossus that rigidi­fied costs, encouraged layoffs, pro­duced the national – emergency strike, forced the government into the position of virtual arbitrator, and served as the most powerful engine of inflation in the economy. Almost the only thing it did not do is what it was presumably in­tended to do, namely, cause real wages to rise faster than productivity.

When our own and other gov­ernments assumed or accepted the responsibility of protecting the people against the risks of unem­ployment, disability, old age, and other hazards, they built into their economies an inflationary bias against which they are still striv­ing, in most cases with very in­different success, and which, un­less arrested, must eventually bring hardship rather than wel­fare, insecurity rather than se­curity, to the intended benefici­aries.

Bitter Medicine

Thus the popular causes that governments espoused a genera­tion ago are having some highly unpopular effects. One of the most unpopular, and rightly unpopular, is inflation, because inflation nulli­fies the security and welfare at which the popular causes are aimed. In resisting inflation, how­ever, governments are finding themselves forced to take meas­ures which run counter to the pop­ular causes and which are nearly or quite as unpopular as the in­flation itself.

In Great Britain and the United States, monetary authorities seem determined to effect price stabili­zation, even at the risk of some sacrifice of the “full-employment commitment.” This policy, how­ever, is arousing strong opposi­tion, and the political repercus­sions that might occur in the event of a substantial business down­turn are not pleasant to contem­plate. In France, government after government has tried to meet the demand for price stabilization, only to fall because its proposed stabilizing devices were politically unacceptable. Conditions in other countries show similar variations, but almost everywhere the same dilemma, the same necessity of choosing between irreconcilable objectives, is being experienced in one form or another.

The basic difficulty is that, al­though inflation is unpopular, the causes that are producing it re­main popular. Men still cling to the belief that governmental au­thority and governmental largess can somehow bring them economic benefits that free private enter­prise cannot bring them. The di­lemma will be resolved only when the people realize that true eco­nomic progress can come only from higher productivity, and that higher productivity can come only from saving, investment, and in­vention which are achieved by in­dividual effort in an environment of freedom and incentive. This progress takes time, but there is no substitute for it. Attempts to hasten it by means of artificially easy money, extravagant spend­ing, and political intervention in economic affairs only produce in­dustrial and monetary disorder, which at best retards progress and at worst can stop it altogether.

From The Guaranty Survey, November 1957. Albert C. Wilcox, editor

 

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Ideas On Liberty
While Men Sleep

So long as the people do not care to exercise their freedom, those who wish to tyrannize will do so; for tyrants are active and ardent, and will devote themselves in the name of any number of gods, religious and otherwise, to put shackles upon sleeping men.

Voltairine De Cleyre