In this series, Dr. Carson examines the connection between Ideology and the revolutions of our time and traces the impact on several major countries and the spread of the ideas and practices around the world.
The neat division of the world into two camps began to lose what validity it had in the mid-1950s. This did not initially signal any lessening of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. Indeed, the division began to lose its sharpness at just that juncture when American foreign policy was most adamant under the leadership of John Foster Dulles. Nor was there any lessening of the American effort to form regional alliances and support them in various parts of the world. Nonetheless, it is now about as clear as it can be in a world muddled by rhetoric which quite often has little discernible connection with reality that the Cold War peaked in the middle of that decade. The two-world concept began to lose its cogency.
Some revisionist historians now claim that the division of the world, and especially the Cold War, was an American device. For example, a recent textbook declares that "the United States having invented the bogey of the international Communist conspiracy, and then by its own policies having turned that fantasy into fact, now became frightened out of its wits by it." The United States did not, of course, invent the Communist conspiracy. On the contrary, American political leaders did their best for years to ignore the evidence for it, admitting it, to the extent they ever did, after revelations made denial impracticable.
In point of fact, it was communists who divided the world in two. From the time of the formation of the Communist International, they held to a view that the world was critically divided. Their writers have long referred to it as a division between socialist and capitalist nations. Soviet writers have kept to this terminology over the years.
At any rate, a congeries of events occurred in the 1950s which made the bipolar—one pole in Moscow and the other in Washington—world view less and less applicable. With the driving of the Nationalist Chinese from the mainland, Red China leaders consolidated their rule and began to develop a sphere of communist influence outside the Soviet sphere. It was the Chinese who intervened in the Korean War, not the Russians. Washington’s credibility as the defender against communism may have waned as a result of the acceptance of the Korean standoff. It definitely did when the United States did not intervene on behalf of the uprising in Hungary. Even the European unity was severely strained by the failure of the United States to support Britain in the Suez Crisis.
Origin of the idea
But a much better indication of the break-up of the bipolar world was the emergence of what has been called the Third World. The term began to come into currency around 1955.2 The term was given body, of sorts, by the Bandung Conference held during the same year. Representatives of twenty-nine Asian and African nations met in Bandung, Indonesia. "Communists and proto-Communists vied with anti-Communists in denouncing Western colonialism . . ., in lauding the high purposes of the UN, and in asserting that recourse to arms in national self-defense was wholly justifiable. In a notable demonstration of solidarity, at least in sentiment, the delegates promised to steer clear of East-West quarrels, if that could be achieved. Speaking for Red China, Chou En-lai . . . uttered sentiments calculated to soothe apprehension that Peking nurtured aggressive designs upon neighbors. . . ."3 For a brief period it looked as if the Third World might become a definite entity, but it did not. It has remained largely a concept with whatever content one wished to ascribe to it, although it usually refers to Asian, African, and sometimes Latin American nations.
France has not figured to any extent in this account thus far. Although the omission can be explained by the necessity of keeping the presentation within some sort of bounds, it is nonetheless an unfortunate one. French thinkers have had considerable impact on and many of them have been clearly under the sway of the idea that has the world in its grip. Although France has declined as a world power in this century, Frenchmen have often been at the forefront of cultural developments. Indeed, France—perhaps Paris would be more accurate—has been the spiritual home of the avant garde in literature and the arts. And that is a way of saying that much of the cultural transformation of this era has had its inception in France and has spread outward from that center. The significance of this is more easily perceived when it is understood that cultural alteration both prepares the way for the victory of the idea and is the main object of those under the sway of the idea.
A strong case can be made that ideology is the natural mode of French thought. Modern intellectual history provides ample evidence to support such a thesis. John Calvin tended to ideologize Christianity. Rene Descartes provided an ideology for modern science, although Francis Bacon’s formula is better known. The Marquis de Sade brought forth an ideology of Sadism, which has furnished the tangled motif of modern revolutions.4 Jean Jacques Rousseau constructed an ideology of democratism, and provided as well the seminal work for undergirding educationism. The fundaments of socialism first appeared in the works of an obscure Frenchman by the name of Morelly.5 Communist thought had its French forebears, but it was, of course, Karl Marx who gave it the formulation which has now swept over much of the world. Perhaps for that reason French intellectuals have been less than satisfied with the Marxist dogmas even when they have been enamored of them. They must somehow be twisted into a Gallic framework, as witness Jean Paul Sartre’s existentialism and Teilhard de Chardin’s evolutionism.
The French Influence
Be that as it may, the Third World concept may be French in its origin. Sartre may have been the first to use the terms Moreover, in the last years of the Fourth Republic, the French referred to the "center" complex of socialist parties as a "Third Force," a phrase sufficiently similar to have given rise to the other. Two components of the Third World concept are national independence and ideological eclecticism. Both components involved "non-alignment," non-alignment with either the Soviet or American camp, and nonalignment with either ideology. Charles de Gaulle took the leadership both in trying to revive French influence and in having France follow an independent course in foreign affairs. He was particularly concerned to shake off dependence on the United States. To that end, he promoted the development of nuclear weapons by France, and downgraded participation in NATO. He favored, however, a continental force of European powers which he referred to as a "Third Force."7 By boldly following this course France set an example for Third World nations.
De Gaulle was ideologically eclectic, too. Although he was a nationalist more than anything else, he presided over a government that was more or less socialist in its animus. (None other would have been acceptable to Frenchmen generally.) But the strain of ideological eclecticism runs deeper than that in post World War II French thought. There were rumblings amongst French thinkers of the decline or end of ideology. The kind of eclecticism that this portended had much earlier been formulated by Americans as pragmatism or instrumentalism. The French semi-Marxist, Jean Paul Sartre, provided a different gloss for it in his exposition of existentialism.
Sartre denied the validity of Marxian materialism. It is a species of essentialism, and since existence precedes essence, there are no such pre-conditioning essences. Nor is the emergence of socialism, or communism, written in the historical stars, so to speak. If emerge it does, it will be because men made it emerge and, if they do so, they must do it in terms of the situation that they find themselves in. There is no order and no particular set of circumstances which will bring it forth. Sartre stated it this way:
The revolutionary considers that he builds socialism, and since he has shaken off and overthrown all legal rights, he recognizes its existence only in so far as the revolutionary class invents, wills and builds it. . . . It does not lie at the end of the road, like a boundary-mark; it is the scheme formulated by humanity. It will be what men make it; it is the outcome of the soberness with which the revolutionary envisages his action. . . .
Thus the philosophy of revolution, transcending both idealist thinking which is bourgeois and the myth of materialism which suited the oppressed masses for a while, claims to be the philosophy of man in the general sense.8
It may appear that Sartre had opted for evolutionary or gradualist socialism, but by his language he denies this. He claims to be a revolutionary, which would separate him from that persuasion. He was claiming, too, to be the proponent of another way, a "third way," to socialism. It would, of necessity, be ideologically eclectic, for it would be a building of socialism within given situations. Some such notion went into the Third World concept.
Nehru in India
Another prime influence on the Third World concept was India and its leader Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru was educated in England, and while there he completely imbibed socialist doctrine. During the period of his indoctrination British socialists were committed to government ownership (nationalization) of all major industries. The debacle of English nationalization did not turn Nehru against socialism, but it did sway him toward a more eclectic course. In any case, India was hardly in position to follow Western models of gradualism.
Nehru embarked on a course of neutrality in relations with East and West. As one history describes his position: "Much impressed though he was by Soviet economic achievements, Nehru stood forth as the most influential non-Communist voice in Asia. . . . Without equivocation, he declared that Marxism was an outmoded nineteenth-century creed, incapable of solving the vexing problems of India. . . . Nehru only tepidly fought communism outside of his homeland, and adopted the middle way of neutralism, of nonalignment, in the secular struggle between the Communist bloc and . . . the West."9 But whatever its origins, and whatever influences may have helped to shape the Third World concept, it was nonetheless grist for the mills of communism from the outset. It could be, and was, fitted into the communist dogma of imperialism. Lenin had leaned heavily on the imperialist dogma, both to justify the revolution in Russia and as the basis of a predicted forthcoming world-wide revolution. He also reinterpreted the Marxist vision of the future in terms of imperialism. Marx’s prediction, according to Lenin, had been thwarted by the development of Western imperialism, and capitalism had been temporarily saved from the onslaught of a disinherited proletariat. Here is a summary statement of Lenin’s position:
Lenin’s explanation for the loss of revolutionary enthusiasm among the Western workers was simple—they were no longer exploited. More accurately, an important section of the workers, the most skilled and intelligent, were no longer exploited and had become bourgeoisified. This section of the workers and the financiers joined together to exploit the backward nations of the world: the financiers thus replaced class exploitation with the exploitation of other countries. The industrial nations will never therefore be revolutionized until the backward nations are freed from the colonial powers. Beginning with Lenin, then, the focus of the Communist Revolution shifts to Asia, Africa and Latin America. . . .
The Leninist tour de force saved Marxian revolutionism. The class struggle then became an international struggle between two camps: on the one side the exploited, non-industrialized nations… ; on the other side the industrialized nations of the West. . . .’10
The Stalinist strategy, however, did not follow this pattern with any consistency. Stalin concentrated on developing communism in one country, the Soviet Union, on fostering the development of Moscow dominated parties in all other countries, and eventually the use of the Red Army to fasten communism on eastern Europe. Communists always carried on a verbal assault against Western imperialism, of course, but it was only after Stalin’s death, and in a new context, that Lenin’s theory emerged to undergird a full-fledged strategy.
When so many colonies either broke away or were cut loose from colonial powers after World War II, the stage appeared to be set for communist expansion. Indeed, the Cominform became quite industrious in fostering guerilla warfare and other forms of incipient revolution. Things did not, however, go according to communist plan. As has already been noted, the United States intervened to take up much of the slack occasioned by the withdrawal of former colonial powers, began to offer economic and military aid, and to form regional alliances around the world. The Cold War developed. The golden opportunity for communist expansion was being lost, in the main.
There was yet another problem for communism, a problem of how to approach these newly freed colonies. The militantly aggressive tactics of the Stalinist period were hardly calculated to win friends and influence people in these former colonies. These were the "exploited" peoples. To foster parties under the control of Moscow and designed to stir up revolts against their own governments, however newly formed, would surely alienate these peoples. (That is not to say that the Soviet Communists were above doing all these things, but it was an ineffectual tactic and hardly a posture to be avowed.)
The Third World concept provided a convenient solution to these problems, too "convenient," one suspects, not to have been at least partially devised by communists.
A new line about former colonies was advanced. The old colonialism was being replaced by a new colonialism, referred to as "neocolonialism." As Thomas Molnar pointed out, "Circles which promote the slogan of ‘neo-colonialism’ insist, of course, that the big companies (in French Africa, in the Copper Belt, for example) exploit their host countries just as much as before independence. In fact, it is alleged that exploitation had been stepped up because there is an increasing demand for minerals by industrialized countries, and also because the companies’ freedom of action in decolonized territories is no longer checked as it was in the days of an Administration representing a strong overseas government."11 According to this view, only the communist countries, which had no private businesses, could bring about real decolonization.
In keeping with all this a new Soviet strategy took shape. One writer describes it this way:
The basic Soviet view of the less developed countries changed radically from that held in the period 1948-1953. . . . The U.S.S.R. came to believe that in the short term, at least, countries might exist which because of their own convictions and interests chose to be aligned with neither the West nor the Communist camp.
Concomitant with the basic shift in Soviet foreign policy outlined above was the increased reliance on economic means of influencing the less developed countries. A sweeping economic offensive in the third world emerged after 1953 in the form of numerous trade and economic aid agreements. . . .12
Another ascribes the change to Soviet Cold War strategy:
In the 1950′s, the third-world strategy was attached to the so-called process of decolonization, and non-Communist… regimes were enlisted in a general posture of neutralism which, while it was not particularly helpful to Communist expansion, was immensely harmful to the strategic position and moral prestige of the West."
A Soviet writer, writing in the late 1960s, made the following claims for the extent of foreign aid by the Soviet Union:
The Soviet Union began to establish extensive economic ties with Afro-Asian countries in the mid-1950′s. Along side the growing volume of ordinary export-import trade, an important role was played by technical and economic cooperation based on inter-government agreements. By 1956, such agreements had been signed with Afghanistan and India alone, whereas today the USSR is giving economic and technical assistance to 29 Afro-Asian countries."
Symbolic Aid from Russia
The granting of aid was of great symbolic ideological significance for the Soviet Union. I noted earlier that underdeveloped countries could not readily follow the gradualist model of industrialized countries. They have neither the technology to produce it nor great wealth to redistribute. The way of the West to socialism could hardly be appropriate to their circumstances. By contrast, Soviet Communists claimed that Russia had been an underdeveloped country, and that communism had provided the way for its development. Foreign aid, particularly the provision of factories, constituted the best sort of proof they could offer.
A scholar summed up the position this way: "The emergence of the Soviet Union as a major economic power and an additional source of capital has enabled it to present itself to the developing countries as an alternate economic model: a former economically backward country which had attained an impressively rapid rate of economic growth in a relatively short period of time." The "Soviet Union has pressed its claims that only a centrally planned and controlled economy… can provide the desired social and economic development."15
This Soviet aid was not, however, carried out in the simple context of the Cold War conflict between East and West. It was also a part of the mounting rivalry between the Soviet Union and Communist China. Each of these countries was contesting for dominance of communist parties in many countries, and for leadership of the communist movement in general. The Soviet shift to economic assistance occurred at about the same time that the Chinese began tentatively to offer assistance. A recent book gives a brief history of that aid in these words. "Peking has been in the aid business since 1953 . . ., and to date has aided more than fifty-five countries on five continents. . . . China’s economic aid program has increased many times in size and scope since 1953. . . . Recent aid promises offer further evidence. In 1970 Chinese aid nearly matched its total official aid to non-Communist countries up to that time and amounted to nearly sixty-five per cent of the total Communist bloc aid to underdeveloped countries. . . ."16 Among the countries China had extended aid to were Cambodia, Burma, Nepal, Laos, Ghana, Algeria, Kenya, Nigeria, Chile, and Peru.
The purpose of Chinese aid is suggested in this argument by a French Marxist: "There is really no way out for the people of the Third World in this context [imperialism and exploitation]. It is not a question of whether socialism is attractive to their rulers or leading thinkers. . . . It is simply a matter of accepting the evidence; there is no other possible solution; like it or not, for them China is the great example."17
Chinese Credentials for Third World Leadership
The Chinese credentials were advanced as being impeccable for the leadership of the Third World, in contrast, say, to those of Russia. Russia had been an independent nation (more properly, empire) before the Bolshevik Revolution, and had been little subject to "imperialistic exploitation." By contrast, China had been carved into spheres of influence in the late nineteenth century and had been the playground of "imperial" powers until the Communist takeover. Incidentally, the militant nationalism of Chinese Communists was palpable to foreigners who happened to get detained in China during the period of Chinese isolation (1950s into the 1970s).
Moreover, there were ugly racial overtones enunciated in the Chinese thrust to leadership of the Third World. The Russians were excluded from the Bandung Conference on the grounds that they were white.18 The explicitness of this racism has been pointed up by Boris Meissner. He says:
The violence of the collision between Russian and Chinese nationalism is partly a result of racial components which lend the struggle of the two powers certain atavistic features. The Russians fear that the Chinese might succeed in playing off the various races within the Communist camp against one another, thus splitting world communism into white and colored wings, with the latter having numerical predominance. Peking makes use of Communist front organizations such as the World Peace Council and the World Federation of Trade Unions, as well as Chinese-oriented bodies such as the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference, as forums where they attack the policies of the Soviet hegemonial power and play off the colored peoples against the whites.19
Given the communist interpretation of Western "imperial exploitation," the racist connotations were virtually unavoidable. (Given, too, the hypersensitivity to race in the world since World War II.) Most of the peoples in subject colonies in the twentieth century have been "colored." If colonies were devices for exploiting these people, then they were devices for exploiting the "colored races." Indeed, the Third World concept was shot through with these racial overtones. It has never been so explicit as absolutely to exclude countries with a preponderance of white people, such as some Latin American countries, that has nevertheless been its tendency.
Even though communists have tried to take full advantage of the Third World concept, it would be a mistake to view it simply as a plot to foster communist expansion. The greatest advantages, at least initially, accrued to the politicians and dictators of the third world. Not only did communists subscribe to the notion that Western imperialism had been a system of exploitation of subject peoples but so have most Western intellectuals.20 This gave Third World politicians ready made enemies—Western imperialists—something most useful to politicians, especially when the enemies are not constituents. They could appeal for the unity of their peoples against these outsiders. It also provided an explanation and an excuse for their economic backwardness. They were not to blame for their condition; they had been overcome by superior technology and exploited by Westerners.
A Powerful Political Tool
The Third World Concept was useful in many other ways to those countries which could use it. It enabled them to play off East against West. Most of these countries accepted aid from Washington, from Moscow, from Peking, or from whatever source they could get it. Since they were non-aligned, the aid they received entailed few, if any responsibilities. Indeed, the Third World concept was, and is, an irresponsible concept. The countries are not, according to the concept, responsible for the conditions which prevail there, and they accept little or no responsibility for what goes on in the world. If, or, better still, when, since it is usually only a matter of time, they confiscate the private property of foreign investors, or foreigners in general, the concept justifies that, too. After all, the foreigners had only been there to exploit them.
In short, the Third World concept is a most useful ploy for politicians and dictators in many parts of the world. They can shake their fists at the great world powers. They can hold out their hands for aid, threaten one side that if they do not give aid they will get it from the other, and offer little or nothing in return. Numerous small nations claim the full fruits of sovereignty, take their places among the great powers in the United Nations, form concert with other small nations to extort concessions, and do not even pay their dues. The concept provides an apology for two-faced behavior, beggary, thievery, extortion, and irresponsibility.
But our main concern here is with the place of the Third World concept in the frame of the idea that has the world in its grip. It is, of course, part and parcel of that idea. It fits in most particularly as a part of the pressure for redistribution of the wealth from the haves to the have-nots, as the phrase has it, among the nations. Since the redistribution is from nation to nation, or, as in the case of the confiscation of foreign holdings, from private sources to nation, it is very much a socialist idea. Its nationalism is a means of concerting efforts within the nation behind the programs that are advanced and the oppressions they entail.
The Third World concept covertly implies, when it is not explicitly stated, that there is a third way to socialism. There is a non-ideological way to socialism, an eclectic way. In short, there is a way to socialism that does not entail the dogmas either of revolutionary or evolutionary socialism. It is not a matter for wonder that anyone setting out for socialism in the last couple of decades should hanker for such a possibility.
After all, Stalin had managed to thoroughly soil whatever of the Marxist dogmas had gone into Leninism-Stalinism. He had to some degree succeeded in hiding the full degradation of communist rule from the world during his reign. But he was not long dead before he was being publicly denounced by Soviet Communists. By the late 1950s, if not before, only the purblind could deny that Soviet Communism was terrorism, tyranny, bureaucratic oppression, and a failure from whatever angle it could be examined save one—it did succeed in fastening totalitarian rule on the Russian people. The dogmas of Marxism as they had been strained through the Soviet mesh had about as much appeal as stale bread laced with poison.
A Futile Quest
The most cherished dogma of Fabian socialism—nationalization—had proved a disaster for the English. Hitlerism had cast a pall over national socialism, at least in its racist formulation. The pale socialisms of continental Europe smacked of everlasting compromises, compromises in which an increasing portion of the wealth of the citizenry was drawn into the maw of governmental machines, in which private industry was shackled by regulation, and in which the money in hand was declining in value because of inflation. The United States was neither much better nor much worse, and few enough recognized it as a road to socialism. In any case, gradualist socialism offered few prospects for the politicians of the Third World. They did not have the wealth to distribute, nor the patience and time to acquire it.
The Third World concept is a fraud. There is no third way to socialism. In fact, there is no way to achieve the vision of socialism, hence all socialisms are frauds, but let that go. One way is by terror and violence—that is revolutionary socialism. The other is to buy votes with the promise of goods taken from the populace by subtle uses of force—that is democratic socialism. True, there are many possible combinations of terror and violence with populism, but Hitler had used most of them before many of the Third World dictators had reached their majority. About all that the Third World has contributed to the mix is an apologia for extorting alms from other governments.
The Third World concept is, however, fearsome testimony to the firmness of the grip the idea now has on the world and to the decline in clear thought that has accompanied the process. More nations have been born since World War II than existed before that catastrophe. They were brought forth with proud claims of independence and buoyant cries of freedom. Yet one by one they have been dragged down the dreary by-path marked as the third way to the Valhalla of socialism, if it has been marked at all. The roll call of these nations is too long to make here; the sordid account of their petty rulers would take up too much space; their oppressions too dreary to make good newspaper fare. Even the recognition of ideologies, much less the construction of a passable one, surpasses their skill.
A Passing Phase
The Third World concept did not signify the end of ideology; it more nearly signified the reduction of ideology to obscenity. The barbarization and degradation which attends socialism produced its pale reflection in the Third World. For a brief span of time, concentrated in the mid-1960s, the Third World concept captured the imagination, perhaps even the idealism, of a good many people. The Third World concept promised redemption, redemption not only for the Third World, but for the whole world.21 There was a way other than the way of life of Europe, America, or the Soviet Union. Virtue resided in the former oppressed peoples of the world, in Africans, in Chinese, in Indians, in American Indians, and so forth. Western technology was an affliction of the world. We must go in sack cloth and ashes to learn from the gurus of the Third World the secret of life. So, many young people exhorted us.
There was something exceedingly strange about all this. The young people who heralded this new dispensation in Europe and America forswore ideology, yet carried banners proclaiming the virtues of Mao tse Tung, Ho chi Minh, and Che Guevara, prime ideologues, if any there were. They claimed reaches of tolerance for themselves never before conceived, but were intolerant of all disagreement. There may have been a modicum of thought which preceded their emergence as enthusiasts, but it was drowned out by their obscenities once they were under way. It is not too much to say, then, that in the hands of its youthful proponents, the Third World concept became obscenity.
Although the Third World concept no longer glitters with bright promise—indeed, it never got very far off the ground—but it nonetheless had considerable impact. It served as a cover sometimes for communist regimes to be established. But, equally important, it introduced a deal of confusion into the world. Ideological lines were blurred. The theretofore clear distinction between communist and noncommunist was now much harder to make. The world was not divided into two; it was divided into many. A softening process had taken place, a softening up for further stages of the development of the idea that has the world in its grip, perhaps. It contributed much to a further lessening of confidence in Western Civilization, or what remains of it. It helped to prepare the way for a different scenario, although it may be no more substantial than was the Third World.
Next: 29. The Cold War: Coexistence, Detente, and Convergence.
iForrest McDonald, Leslie E. Decker and Thomas P. Govan, The Last Best Hope: A History of the United States (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1972), p. 950.
2See Ignacy Sachs, The Discovery of The Third World (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1976), p. xi.
°Arthur J. May, Europe Since 1939 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 435.
4Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Leftism (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1974), pp. 78-83.
gbid., pp. 107-08.
°Sachs, op. cit., p. xi.
7May, op. cit., p. 368.
°Franklin Baumer, ed., Main Currents of Western Thought (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), p. 712.
°May, op. cit., p. 430.
"Leo Paul de Alvarez, "Imperialism: The Threat to Existence," The Intercollegiate Review, II (March-April, 1966), p. 312.
"Thomas Molnar, "Neo-Colonialism in Africa?" Modern Age, IX (Spring 1965), p. 178. "Robert S. Walters, American and Soviet Aid (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970), pp. 29-30.
"Joseph Schiebel, "Convergence or Confrontation?" The Intercollegiate Review, V (Winter, 1968-69), p. 110.
"I. Kapranov, "The USSR and Industrial Development of Newly Free States," in Internationalism, National Liberation and Our Epoch (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, n. d.), p. 104.
"Leo Tansky, U.S. and U.S.S.R. Aid to Developing Countries (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. vi.
"John F. Cooper, China’s Foreign Aid (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1976), p. 1. "Pierre Jal6e, The Pillage of the Third World (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968), p. 110.
"William H. Chamberlin, "Communism in Disarray," Modern Age, IX (Spring 1965), p. 192.
"Boris Meissner, "World Communism: Decay or Differentiation," Modern Age, IX (Summer 1965), p. 244.
"See de Alvarez, op. cit., p. 312.
21See Sachs, The Discovery of the Third World, op. cit., passim, and especially the concluding chapter.